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The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform
Catherine E. Vance*
and Paige Barr**
The people of this country, not special interest big money, should be
the source of all political power. Government must remain the do-
main of the general citizenry, not a narrow elite ... This means that
the values and preferences of all citizens, not just those who can get
our attention by waving large campaign contributions in front of us,
must be considered in the political debate. One person, one vote - no





This article was a work in progress on October 25, 2002, the day
Senator Paul Wellstone died in a plane crash.
Through my work, I have been involved with the bankruptcy reform
legislation for most of its history3 and I had become very cynical about
* Ms. Vance is an attorney in private practice in Columbus, Ohio, and serves as a Legal
Writer/Analyst and National Education Coordinator for the Commercial Law League of
America. Ms.Vance concentrates her practice on debtor/creditor law, including bankruptcy and
consumer law matters, and has taught legal courses at a local paralegal education program. Ms.
Vance has authored several articles on bankruptcy, debt collection and privacy, including Attor-
neys and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001: Understanding the Imposition of Sanctions against
Debtors' Counsel, 106 CoM. L.J. 241 (2001), is a regular contributor to the BANK. Y.B. & ALMA-
NAC, and served as Associate Editor for the 94th edition of the National Association of Credit
Management's Manual of Credit and Commercial Laws. A United States Army veteran, Ms.
Vance received her Bachelor's Degree, magna cum laude, from the Ohio State University and is
a graduate of the Ohio State University College of Law, where she was awarded the American
Bankruptcy Institute's Medal for Excellence in Bankruptcy Studies. Thanks for help with this
article go to the usual suspects, including, of course, Shelby Nincehelser-Vance.
** J.D. from DePaul University College of Law expected May 2004; University of Pittsburgh,
B.A., 2001.
1. 147 CoNo. REc. S3544, S3545-46 (2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
2. By Ms. Vance.
3. The Bankruptcy Reform Bill was first introduced during the 105th Congress in the House
as H.R. 3150 on February 3, 1998. This bill was passed on June 10, 1998. The Senate version, S.
1301 was introduced on October 21, 1997. The Senate passed the companion measure H.R.
3150, in lieu of S. 1301, on September 23, 1998. Ultimately, however Congress was unable to
pass bankruptcy reform, and the measure died at the end of the 105th Congress. During the
106th Congress the bill was reintroduced in the House as H.R. 833 on February 24, 1999. On
March 16, 1999, the Senate introduced S. 625. H.R. 833 and S. 625 produced a conference
report that was rolled into H.R. 2415. H.R. 2415 was subsequently passed on December 7, 2000,
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the political process and the people who call themselves "public ser-
vants" (though I do not recall hearing many use that term - they seem
to like "public official" better).
Senator Wellstone's opposition to the bankruptcy legislation was
the one aspect of the whole process on which I had pinned my hopes;
his willingness to stand alone and oppose a bill that has enjoyed near
unanimous support in Congress 4 allowed me to believe that the whole
system was not, if fact, corrupt and driven solely by moneyed
interests.
I watched the news that night, listening to the many journalists, pol-
iticians, and others talk about Senator Wellstone and noting the recur-
ring theme: Senator Wellstone was a man of integrity; he was not
afraid to speak his conscious in Congress even if it meant alienating
this or that demographic. 5 I knew this about the Senator already,
given his unbending insistence that the bankruptcy reform legislation
was a rotten bill that would only hurt ordinary Americans. What
struck me was how unique this particular quality seemed to be.6 It
was as if Senator Wellstone stood alone in having the kind of charac-
ter we should be able to expect from all of our elected officials.
but President Clinton pocket vetoed the measure. Then again in the 107th Congress the bill was
reintroduced in the House as H.R. 333 on January 1, 2001 and passed on November 15, 2002.
The Senate introduced S. 420 on March 1,2001. A conference report emerged in July 2002, but
ultimately, bankruptcy reform failed to make it out of the 107th Congress due to controversial
language regarding abortion. Despite the existence of these many bills, this Article will refer to
them collectively as "bankruptcy reform" for the sake of convenience.
4. In a vote of 97-1 Senator Wellstone stood as the lone nay against the Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1998. 144 CONG. REC. S10739-04 (1998), available at 1998 WL 65049 (Cong.
Rec.).
5. Written less than six months before Senator Wellstone died, an article about his re-election
campaign aptly described the Senator:
At a moment when most Democrats are still trying to figure out how to challenge a
popular President, the former college wrestler is leaping into the ring. Wellstone is not
running for cover; he is running to deliver a message about politics in a state and a
nation that he believes to be far more progressive than the readers of political tea
leaves in Washington could begin to imagine ... Paul's a controversial guy. He's the
little guy who takes on the big guys. That is not something the political process is
designed to reward these days. If you take strong stands you put yourself at risk - and
Paul takes more strong stands than just about anyone else.
John Nichols, Wellstone and the White House Duke It Out: The Senate's Most Progressive Mem-
ber Is in the Fight of His Life, NATION, May 27, 2002, 2002 WL 2210547 (quoting Myron Orfield,
whom the article describes as "widely regarded as one of the nation's top experts in the study of
voting patterns").
6. Underscoring the seeming rarity of such virtues as integrity was Time Magazine's selection
for its 2002 "Persons of the Year," three ordinary women who all had an "extraordinary" quality
in common - the ability and courage to tell the truth. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley,
Persons of the Year; Sherron Watkins of Enron Coleen Rowley of the FBI Cynthia Cooper of
WorldCom, TIME MAO., Dec. 30, 2002, at 30.
BANKRUPTCY REFORM
All this talk confirmed what I had believed: my cynical attitude that
Congress and the Presidency belong to the wealthy seemed validated.
Since the demographic to which I belong restricts my own access to
the power brokers, I felt as if I had lost the one voice in Congress that
was willing to speak on my behalf. Even if the cause of the average
American was ignored in the final product, be it bankruptcy reform or
some other legislation, at least our voices would be heard and our
concerns stated on the record.
However, there remained the task of this Article. All during the
day after Senator Wellstone's death, I drew a complete blank. What I
had been attempting seemed hollow, as if I were going through the
motions of the writing process without producing anything worth-
while, other than additional reading for those of us who find bank-
ruptcy law to be interesting.
If the sense of loss I felt over Senator Wellstone's death was causing
my belief that this Article would ring hollow - which was surely true -
then the only thing for me to do was to change the character of the
Article. I decided to proceed with a new voice in mind.
Ms. Barr, who began work on this Article as a research assistant,
viewed the change in tone with much enthusiasm and willingly took
on the role of co-author. I must commend her dedication to this Arti-
cle, the hard work she contributed, and her contribution to the angry-
prophet-renouncing-the-hypocrisy-of-our-times 7 view of Congress and
bankruptcy reform.
We intend this Article to give voice to at least some of the concerns
Senator Wellstone would have advocated had he not died. We sin-
cerely hope we succeed. As we explain, the bankruptcy reform pro-
cess is a function of the power structure in Congress and represents a
dangerous trend in lawmaking. It is in Senator Wellstone's memory -
and toward his vision - that we proceed.
7. I've taken this line from the Peter Finch character in "Network." The movie makes for a
particularly apt portrayal of corporate power in America. While engaging in his "angry
prophet" rhetoric, Finch's character had no idea, because he was actually insane, that the corpo-
rate executives, who knew his rantings, were duping him (such as urging viewers to go to their
windows and shout, "I'm mad as hell, and I'm not going to take it anymore!") would get high
ratings. It also allowed the corporate-run television network to put on a program that was sup-
posed to be a news program but which, in actuality, was empty entertainment. NETWORK
(MGM 1976).
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.I. INTRODUCTION
We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals; we
know now that it is bad economics.8
'Reform' was the premise for a lot of legislative activity in 2002.
Corporate and accounting reform,9 campaign finance reform, 10 and
bankruptcy reform,"I were all before Congress in 2002 and were ac-
companied by considerable media attention.' 2 It is the last of these on
which this Article will focus, not because the others are not worthy of
comment, but because of the marked distinctions between the origins
and perceived need for bankruptcy reform versus other reform efforts.
Moreover, a careful examination of the history and substance of bank-
ruptcy reform calls into question the sincerity of Congress in enacting
other reform initiatives,' 3 as well as the general commitment of our
8. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address, in HOME OF THE BRAVE AMERICA'S
TRADITION OF FREEDOM, LIBERTY, & TOLERANCE (Erik Bruun & Robin Getzen eds., Black
Dog & Leventhal Publishers, Inc. 2001) (1996).
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. The stated purpose of this
legislation is "[11o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclo-
sures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes." Id. Whether Sarbanes-
Oxley achieves this goal remains to be seen, as problems in its implementation have already
arisen. Id. See infra note 13.
10. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 181. As
with Sarbanes-Oxley, the effectiveness of campaign finance reform requires the passage of time,
but there are implementation problems here, too. See infra note 12.
11. H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2002). Although substantially similar bills were also considered in
the 105th and 106th Congresses, we refer to all these bills as "bankruptcy reform," unless other-
wise noted, for the sake of simplicity.
12. Bankruptcy reform received little coverage on television, but has been the subject of some
comment in the print media. See e.g., David Broder, Unworthy Bankruptcy Bill, THE REC.-
BERGEN COUNTY, N.J., May 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4657895 (stating that the topic has
been widely ignored except on the business pages in the press). Of course, even extensive cover-
age in the print media does not mean that most Americans fully understand bankruptcy reform
and its heavy industry support, or its harsh view of individuals' financial distress. Obviously,
most peopledo not regularly read the many newspapers that have addressed bankruptcy reform.
Moreover, studies have shown that the majority of people tend to get their regular news from
television, local news programs in particular, rather than the print media. See e.g., Pew Center
For Civic Journalism, Straight Talk from Americans - 2000, at http://www.pewcenter.org/doingcj/
research/rST2000.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) (finding 59 percent watch local television
news daily compared to 44 percent who read a local daily newspaper).
Also worth noting, although beyond the scope of this Article is the significant and well-de-
served criticism that the media does not properly serve its essential role of informing the people
because the industry has been concentrated into the hands of a few large corporate interests. See
generally DEAN ALGER, MEGAMEDIA: How GIANT CORPORATOINS DOMINATE MASS MEDIA,
DISTOR'r COMPETrION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY (Rowman & Littlefield Pub., Inc. (1998).
13. The Administration's commitment to corporate, accounting, and campaign finance reform
is already in doubt. Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with respect to the accounting indus-
try, brought about nothing but further controversy that eventually led to SEC Chairman Harvey
Pitt's election night resignation. Mr. Pitt's Belated Departure, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at A30.
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elected officials to passing legislation that is in the best interests of the
country rather than favored special interest groups.1 4
Corporate and accounting reforms stem, of course, from the scan-
dals that came to the public's attention beginning with the collapse of
Enron. There is no need to recount the history of these scandals, for
do to so would be redundant of not only substantial news coverage,
but scholarly works as well.15 However, it is important to note that
the problems that Enron came to symbolize significantly predated the
collapse of that corporate giant without Congress's decision to take
affirmative, corrective action. 16 Indeed, Congress not only passed leg-
Campaign finance reform is also under a dark cloud. In developing implementing regulations,
the Federal Elections Commission, some argue, has substantially weakened the reform law.
John McCain, a promoter of the legislation, seems to have already admitted defeat in his state-
ment: "'[W]e now find this reform law threatened by both political parties, the special interests
who are regrouping, and also by the very regulatory body of the federal government charged
with its interpretation."' McCain-Feingold RIP, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2002, at A18, available at
2002 WL-WSJ 103127804. Even those charged with implementing the campaign finance reform
have expressed their opposition to the law. Gail Russell Chaddock, Signature Laws That May
Not Leave Signature; Hard Part For Campaign Finance, School, and Corporate Reform Is Imple-
mentation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov.29, 2002, at 2, available at 2002 WL 6429507. One
example of the loopholes created by the FEC's implementation is the allowance of federal candi-
dates to solicit money for their parties at state and local levels. The Campaign Finance Reform
prohibits the raising of soft money, however the legislation only applies only to federal law. The
FEC permits the raising of soft money at the state and local levels for the parties, which will
undoubtedly find its way to the federal level campaigns. Campaign Finance Dodge, J. NEWS,
Nov. 6, 2002, at 6B, available at 2002 WL 101879185.
14. The final days of the 107th Congress provide an appropriate example. The Homeland
Security Bill, which is now law, contained the well-publicized perks for industry. At the same
time, Congress failed to extend unemployment benefits. See Zachary Coile & Edward Epstein,
Congress Leaves Much Work Undone; No Budget Passed, No Energy Bill, and No Delta Plan,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 21, 2002, at A4.
15. Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and 'The Perfect Storm,' FORDHAM L. REV. (forth-
coming 2003) (manuscript at n.6-8, on file with authors) (citing scholarly and popular press
articles).
16. See e.g., Christopher H. Schmitt & Paula Dwyer, Did the Auditors Cross the Line? The
SEC Has Tough Questions for Microstrategy and PWC,. Bus. WK., Sept. 25, 2000, at 168 (com-
pany booked $66 million more in revenue - more than one-fifth of sales total - for 1997-99
period, changing each year's bottom line from profits to losses); John A. Byrne, Chainsaw Al
Dunlap Cuts His Last Deal, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Sept. 5, 2002, at http://www.businessweek.com
(Sunbeam's true financial state was hidden from investors from 1996 through early 1998, result-
ing in thousands of lost jobs, $4.4 billion in shareholder losses, and Sunbeam's bankruptcy);
Carol J. Loomis, Hard Time? Hardly, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2002, at 78 (discussing scandals from
the 1990s including Cendent, formed in a 1997 merger of CUC International and HFS, Inc.; four
months later, "CUC's accounting was exposed as rotten, and Cendant's market value dropped
$14 billion in one day"); Clifton Leaf, Enough Is Enough; White-Collar Criminals: They Lie They
Cheat They Steal and They've Been Getting Away With It For Too Long, FORTUNE, Mar. 18. 2002,
at 60 ("Before Enronitis inflamed the public, gigantic white-collar swindles were rolling through
the business world and the legal system with their customary regularity."). And we haven't even
mentioned the now burst tech bubble. See e.g., Megan Barnett, Surviving the Stakeout, INDUS-
TRY STANDARD, Mar. 5, 2001. A "Frontline" report stated that there were more than 700 U.S.
companies that had to restate their earnings in the 1990s, all well before Enron. Bigger Than
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islation that enabled the meteoric rise of WorldCom and Enron,17 it
also expressly declined to remedy the stock options issue that was so
critical to the 2002 scandals,' 8 and was vigorously opposed to a pro-
posed rule that would prohibit accountants from also acting as
consultants. 19
Enron (PBS television broadcast, 2002), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/regu-
lation/etc/script.html. So, rather than being the year of the corporate scandal, 2002 was, in actu-
ality, merely the year the scandals finally became big (or sexy) enough to warrant extensive
media coverage.
17. See e.g., Robert Scheer, Bush is Shocked - Shocked!, (Aug. 14, 2002), at http://
www.salon.com/politics/col/scheer/2002/08/14/worldcom/print.html,:
WorldCom was only a minor player until the Telecommunications Act of 1996, pushed
through Congress by Rep. Newt Gingrich and Sen. Trent Lott and signed into law with
the enthusiastic support of corporation-friendly "New Democrat" President Clinton.
At the behest of lobbyists for WorldCom - based in Lott's home state of Mississippi -
the senator stuck in an amendment specifically designed to enable WorldCom to grab a
huge chunk of the telephone market.
At the time, WorldCom was lagging badly behind the big three long-distance carriers.
Lott's legalese, however, turned this to the company's advantage by specifying that
only companies - such as WorldCom - with 5 percent or less of the long-distance mar-
ket could enter into joint marketing agreements with local phone service suppliers.
The firm was thus free to buy MFS Communications, then the top alternative provider
of local phone services, for $12.4 billion and became the first company to provide both
local and long distance since deregulation forced the breakup of the Bell system.
.. Thus was born the overreaching, out-of-control and fundamentally dishonest corpo-
ration that is now in bankruptcy after conceding false accounting of more than $7
billion.
Id.
18. According to the "Frontline" report, in 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
decided to require that stock options be expensed on a company's balance sheet, closing a loop-
hole that allowed stock options to remain hidden from ordinary investors. CEOs came from all
over the country in a full-steam lobbying effort to prevent the FASB from taking its proposed
action. Senator Lieberman, whose home state of Connecticut has a heavy concentration of ac-
countants, led the charge against the FASB's proposed action, and the Senate passed a non-
binding resolution by a vote of 88 to 9 condemning it. Jim Leisenring, who served as Vice Chair-
man of the FASB at the time and who Frontline interviewed for its report, summarized the battle
over the treatment of stock options: "It wasn't an accounting debate. We switched talking about
whether 'Have we accurately measured the option?' to things like 'Western civilization will not
exist without stock options,' or that there won't be jobs anymore for people without ... stock
options. People tried to take the argument away from the accounting and over to be just plainly
a political argument." Bigger Than Enron, supra note 16. See also, John B. Judis, What W.
Didn't Learn from Enron, Option Play, NEw REPUBLIC ONLINE, Apr. 30, 2002, at http://
www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020506&s=judis5O6O2 (discussing stock options and failed efforts
to address the problems in Congress).
19. According to the Center for Responsive Politics:
In 2000, Arthur Levitt, who was then chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, spotted a potential conflict of interest brewing in the accounting industry. The
"Big Five" accounting firms (Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,
KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers) had managed to increase their income by offer-
ing consulting services to the same companies they audited. Levitt, concerned that the
firms would compromise their credibility when they had to audit their own services,
proposed an SEC rule that would bar accountants from also acting as consultants. But
BANKRUPTCY REFORM
Campaign finance reform, although not stemming from an event of
a particular magnitude like the Enron collapse, is nevertheless similar
to corporate and accounting reform because it represents a Congres-
sional gesture designed to assure the public that moneyed interests
will not completely overrun the interests of the ordinary American.
Campaign finance reform attempts to diminish the influence of the
powerful, moneyed interests in the political process. As Senator Fein-
gold put it:
The people sent us here to wrestle with some very tough issues.
They have vested us with the power to make decisions that have a
profound impact on their lives. That is a responsibility that we take
very seriously. But today, when we weigh the pros and cons of legis-
lation, many people think we also weigh the size of the contribu-
tions we got from interests on both sides of the issue. And when
those contributions can be a million dollars, or even more, it seems
obvious to most people that we would reward, or at least listen es-
pecially carefully to, our biggest donors.20
Bankruptcy reform is a different animal altogether. As this Article
will explore, there are problems with the Bankruptcy Code,21 with
those that are most troubling arising in business bankruptcies under
Chapter 11. Bankruptcy reform, however, addresses none of the real
problems arising under the Code or the genuine abuses that the Code
presently allows. Instead, bankruptcy reform has since its inception
relied on a problem that is, in fact, largely nonexistent, specifically
that too many consumer debtors - real ordinary Americans - are
abusing the good graces of the Code.
At its heart, bankruptcy reform is a useful example of the ever-
widening gulf between the political leadership of this country and the
people whom they are supposed to serve. The impetus for bankruptcy
reform was not public shock or outrage, or even media attention fo-
cusing on the citizenry's rampant abuse of the bankruptcy system. In-
stead, bankruptcy reform has been driven by a myopic focus on the
banking industry's story of the state of consumer bankruptcies and the
when the accounting industry heard about the rule, Levitt became the target of what he
later called an "intensive and venal lobbying campaign." The accounting industry got
46 members of Congress to call or write personal letters to Levitt questioning the pro-
posed rule. Some lawmakers reportedly threatened to withdraw funding from the SEC.
Withering under the assault, the SEC eventually curtailed Levitt's proposal.
See Accounting Industry (Jan.30, 2002), available at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/account-
ants/index.asp. See also, Mike McNamee, et al, Accounting Wars: Powerful Auditor-Consultants
Are the Target of Arthur Levitt's Crusade, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 156, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/index/html..
20. 148 CONG. REC. S 199 (2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2003) [hereinafter "the Code].
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millions of dollars that this same industry poured into politicians'
coffers. 22
Moreover, bankruptcy reform implicates issues much larger than
those too easily dismissed as the rhetoric of class warfare. In the first
place, bankruptcy reform demonstrates the ease with which Congress
will overlook the financial condition of average Americans when the
glare of the media spotlight is absent. The corporate and accounting
reforms, after all, required that Congress act, and act quickly. The
public was aware of the scandals, and the allegations of corporate
greed and misconduct seemed to be indisputably true. Bankruptcy re-
form also allows us to question Congress's sincerity in the reform of
campaign financing. In the same year that campaign finance reform
was enacted, bankruptcy reform, which finds virtually no support
outside of the banking industry,23 came within a breath of enactment,
and ultimately failed only because of a dispute over abortion.2 4 If
ever a piece of legislation exemplifies the power of special interests in
Washington, surely it is bankruptcy reform. Thus, even assuming that
the laws enacted in 2002 reforming campaign financing and corporate
and accounting practices are effective, 25 bankruptcy reform allows us
to question the motives behind the enactment of either; that is, is Con-
gress sincerely committed to legislating in the public interest or simply
22. Since 1996 finance and credit companies have contributed over $37 million in support of
the proposed Bankruptcy Reform bill. Greg Miller, Bill Making Bankruptcy Filings Harder for
Individuals Nears OK, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 2470049.
23. Demonstrating the breadth of opposition to bankruptcy reform is an August 23, 2002 let-
ter to Senators Daschle and Lott, and Representatives Hastert and Gephardt, whose signatories
included American Association of University Women; American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees; Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN); Center for Community Change; Consumer Federation of America; Consumers
Union; The Feminist Majority; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers;
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; Interna-
tional Union, UAW; Leadership Conference on Civil Rights; Lutheran Office for Governmental
Affairs, ELCA; NAACP; Ralph Nader; National Consumer Law Center; National Organization
for Women; NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund; National Partnership for Women and
Families; National Women's Law Center; Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America;
Public Citizen; OWL, The Voice of Midlife and Older Women; Religious Action Center of Re-
form Judaism; Self-Help Credit Union; Transport Workers Union; United Steelworkers of
America; and U.S. Public Interest Research Group (Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with the authors).
24. One of the provisions of the bill attempts to limit the ability of abortion protestors to use
bankruptcy laws to avoid their fines and costs imposed after abortion protests. Anti-abortion
groups and their constituents in Congress have vehemently opposed this provision. Philip She-
non, Anti-abortion Lobbyists Tying Up Bankruptcy - Overhaul Bill, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002,
at 22. Previously, after reaching agreement on this provision, Senator Charles Schumer stated
that the resulting bill was a "victory for women." Philip Shenon, Negotiators Agree on Bill to
Rewrite Bankruptcy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2002, at 1.
25. See supra note 13.
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saving individual members' political careers when the polls dictate the
necessity of taking action?
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II briefly discusses some
of the policy considerations underlying the Bankruptcy Code. Part III
explores two important areas of Chapter 11 bankruptcy that have gen-
erated significant criticism: (1) the excessive use of secured transac-
tions; and (2) the excessive power both the Code and the courts grant
to bankrupt business debtors in a manner that ultimately harms the
most vulnerable of the debtor's creditors, including tort victims, work-
ers and retirees. Part IV examines, and refutes, the premises underly-
ing consumer bankruptcy reform. The ultimate point of this Article is
to demonstrate that the true problems with bankruptcy - and the ar-
eas in which the potential for abuse are very prominent - remain
unaddressed while Congress myopically focuses on the largely untrue
assertion that consumers, and only consumers, are abusing the good
graces of the Code.
II. BANKRUPTCY POLICY
Let us remember that all reforms are interdependent, and that
whatever is done to establish one principle on a solid basis, strength-
ens all. Reformers who are always compromising, have not yet
grasped the idea that truth is the only safe ground to stand upon.26
The problems with bankruptcy, both in its current form and as the
reform measures contemplate, require an understanding of the poli-
cies underlying bankruptcy and the purposes the Code is intended to
serve. Several policies come into play with respect to bankruptcy.
One of bankruptcy's underlying purposes serves to:
[r]elieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebted-
ness and to permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes. This pur-
pose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts
as being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the
honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportu-
nity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.27
Despite the Court's reference to "business misfortunes," this "fresh
start for the honest but unfortunate" standard has come to signify the
very foundation for individual bankruptcy cases. There is a ring of
26. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Introduction to THE FEMINIST PAPERS, FROM ADAMS T"O DE
BEAUVOIR (Alice S. Rossi ed., Northeastern University Press 1998).
27. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citations omitted).
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idealism to this standard that brings to mind the George Bailey 28 sort
of character who, although a person of unwavering integrity, has run
into a bad string of luck.29 The courts nevertheless make use of the
"honest but unfortunate" analysis to this day.30 This notion is re-
flected to some degree in Chapter 11 business cases. For example,
plans must be proposed in good faith31 and the court may appoint a
trustee,32 or convert or dismiss a Chapter 11 case, 33 based on, inter
28. "George Bailey" here refers, of course, to the lead character in IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE
(RKO Radio Pictures 1946). Bailey, despite dreams of a bigger, better life, decides to remain in
his quaint hometown of Bedford Falls. The bank Bailey runs faces a financial crisis when his
cousin Billy misplaces $8,000 (a substantial sum when the film was made) of the bank's funds,
and Bailey finds himself facing significant, possibly criminal, liability. Bailey's situation is only
made worse when it is Mr. Potter, "the richest and meanest man in the county," who ends up
with the $8,000. Potter had always seen Bailey as an adversary because, if not for Bailey and his
damnable integrity, Potter would be far more rich and powerful than he already is. Potter quite
naturally conceals his possession of the money and Bailey ends up in despair. Clarence thwarted
his suicide attempt, an "angel second class" hoping to get his wings. It is through Clarence that
Bailey gains perspective, for Bailey has the opportunity to see what life in Bedford Falls would
have been like without him. The most notable distinction is the character of the town itself,
called "Pottersville" without Bailey's humanistic influence, which is marked by corruption and
sleaze. Despite its sentimentality, director Frank Capra's optimistic belief in the human spirit
triumphing over a love of money and the bad side of humankind greed fosters has a ring of
relevance today. In our modern world, Potter is epitomized by the corrupt CEO who will lie and
cheat to gain advantage, even if innocent people get hurt in the process.
Capra's vision of special interests in the campaign process, for the reader who is interested,
can be found in STATE OF THE UNION (MGM 1948) in which Spencer Tracy portrays a man
who gets into politics based on his principles, but who quickly finds his ideas driven by the
interests that provide him with financial support.
29. See e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Reforming Consumer Bankruptcy Law: Four Proposal: Com-
mon Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461 (1997) (challenging the assumption
that the current system, in practice, distinguishes between the honest but unfortunate and those
whose conduct falls below this idealized standard).
30. See, e.g., In reFretz, 244 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001); Carlos J. Cuevas, Public Values
and the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 645 (1996) (discussing exceptions to discharge
expressing public values).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2003).
32. 1t U.S.C. §1104(a) (2003). Section 1104(a) provides:
(a) At any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of a plan,
on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee -
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement
of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the
commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not including the number of
holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the
debtor; or
(2) if such appointment is in the interest of creditors, any equity security holders,
and other interests of the estate, without regard to the number of holders of
securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor.
33. 11 U.S.C. § l12(b) (2003). Under Section 1112(b), the court may dismiss or convert a
case for cause, including:
(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likeli-
hood of rehabilitation;
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alia, debtor misconduct. Notably, most of these requirements are for-
ward looking; that is, misconduct is measured in the Code in large part
by the actions taken after the bankruptcy case has begun 34 in business
cases.35 In some respects, this post-filing perspective makes sense be-
cause business bankruptcies involve considerations such as jobs and
the ripple effect on other businesses and, perhaps, the community at
large, that do not arise in individual cases. 36 Many of the prominent
bankruptcies of 2002 serve as useful examples because there have
been few intimations of honesty or misfortune, but plenty of evidence
of outright misconduct. 37
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any time fixed by
the court;
(5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of a request made for
additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144 of this title, and denial
of confirmation of another plan or a modified plan under section 1129 of this title;
(7) inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed plan;
(8) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
(9) termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the
plan; or
(10) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28.
Id.
34. See, e.g., id. But see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1104, supra note 31 (allowing appointment of trustee
for fraud, dishonest, or gross management before the case is commenced).
35. Compare Chapter 11 to Chapter 7's section 707(b), 11 U.S.C. §707(b) (2003), which allows
dismissal of consumer cases where "substantial abuse," of the provisions of Chapter 7, exists.
Section 707(b) necessarily requires examination of the consumer debtor's pre-petition motives
for seeking relief.
36. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 178 (2000); But see, Karen Gross,
On the Merits: A Response to Professors Girth and White, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.485 (noting that
individual cases do affect their own communities).
37. The bankruptcies of 2002 were notoriously scandalous. It was painfully clear that they
were not prompted by "honest but unfortunate" businesses. When it named three whistle blow-
ers as Persons of the Year in 2002, Time magazine gave an excellent articulation of that year's
corporate fiascos:
Who knew that the swashbuckling economy of the '90s had produced so many buc-
caneers? You could laugh about the CEOs in handcuffs and the stock analysts who
turned out to be fishier than storefront palm readers, but after a while the laughs came
hard. Martha Stewart was dented and scuffed. Tyco was looted by its own executives.
Enron and WorldCom turned out to be Twin Towers of false promises. They fell. Their
stockholders and employees went down with them. So did a large measure of public
faith in big corporations. Each new offense seemed to make the same point: with com-
munism vanquished, capitalism was left with no real enemies but its own worst im-
pulses. It can be undone by its own overreaching players. It can be bitten to pieces by
its own alpha dogs.
Day after day, one set of misgivings twined around the other, keeping spooked inves-
tors away from the stock market, giving the whole year its undeniable saw-toothed
edge. Were we headed for a world where all the towers would fall? All the more reason
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In both individual and business cases, bankruptcy functions as a col-
lective process. Under state law, creditors may avail themselves of
whatever remedies applicable law permits on an individual basis; if the
debtor is in financial distress, creditors will often be in a race with
each other in pursuing those remedies and whatever assets may be
available. Bankruptcy, aided by the automatic stay,38 is designed to
give debtors a needed reprieve from collections pressures, but pro-
tects creditors as well by providing them a single, collective process
through which each should expect fair and orderly treatment. 39 As
compared with the state law race for available assets, bankruptcy has
its advantages:
[Bankruptcy's] collective procedure is considered more advanta-
geous to the creditors as a group than the alternative of allowing the
individual creditors who move most quickly to recover in full while
others recover little or nothing. Not only is each creditor in the
same class paid the same proportion of its entitlement, but the pro-
ceeds of the estate, and consequently the proportion of the debt
paid, are likely to be higher if the assets are liquidated in a coordi-
nated manner rather than grabbed piecemeal by individual creditors
and sold at distress prices.
40
This collective process is the hallmark of Chapter 7 liquidation
cases, in which the trustee collects, liquidates, and distributes the
debtor's assets for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. Collective
action in Chapter 11 takes a different form. In most cases no trustee is
appointed; rather, the debtor continues to operate the business as
debtor in possession,4 1 carrying with it a fiduciary duty to the bank-
ruptcy estate and its unsecured creditors. 42 In Chapter 11, a creditors'
to figure out quickly, before the next blow to the system, how to repair the fail-safe
operations-in the boardrooms we trusted with our money, at the government agencies
we trust with ourselves-that failed.
Lacayo, supra note 6.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2003).
39. As the legislative history to §362 states:
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it certain creditors
would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who
acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and in detriment of
other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure
under which all creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the
debtor's assets prevents that.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297; S. REP. No. 95-
989, at 49 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5834.
40. RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANK-
RUPTrCY 50 (University of Chicago Press 1991).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2003). For a discussion of criticisms of the debtor in possession con-
cept, see infra Part II.B.
42. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
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committee entrusts a few select creditors, typically the largest, with
the responsibility of protecting the rights and interests of the un-
secured creditor body as a whole. 43
Moreover, whereas Chapter 7 focuses on the efficient and orderly
administration of the estate, Chapter 11 is more of a negotiation pro-
cess, with the Code providing the framework and the rules for the
parties to work toward the ultimate goal - a confirmed plan.44 In the
best of all possible worlds, the debtor will emerge from bankruptcy as
a viable business able to function in the market, and it will pay its
prepetition creditors. This result is almost never obtained. 45 Because
the bankruptcy's dual aims of business viability and maximum creditor
recovery may be in conflict, competing views on the exact purpose to
be served by Chapter 11 have arisen. To state these views as suc-
cinctly as possible, one view is that Chapter 11 should serve the single
purpose of efficient debt collection. 46 On the other hand, there are
those who recognize "that the financial collapse of a firm presents
questions of loss allocation and community interest simply not impli-
cated in individual debtor-creditor disputes," and who believe bank-
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2003). For a comprehensive discussion of creditors' committees
under Chapter 11 see generally, Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Chapter /I Issues: Creditors'
Committees under Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995 (1993). Committees
are not appointed in all Chapter 11 cases, however. Studies show that committees are formed in
only about 15 percent of Chapter 11 cases. Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality, and Prag-
matism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 120
(1998).
44. A Chapter 11 plan can be one for reorganization or liquidation of the business. In re
Ocean Beach Props., 148 B.R. 494, 497 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 1992).
45. See, e.g., Ryan B. Minetti, Ordinary Business Terms: Ending the Debate Surrounding
§547(c)(2)(C), 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 165,172 n.42 (1999)(finding that payments to unsecured credi-
tors on account of pre-petition claims in Chapter 11 are rare); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of
Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) [hereinafter "Death of Liability"]. According to Professor
LoPucki:
Early bankruptcy liquidations produced at least some distributions to creditors in the
majority of cases. By 1976, the percentage of bankruptcy liquidations in which there
was a distribution to unsecured creditors had fallen to twenty percent; by 1991-92 it had
sunk to five percent. In 1926-27, unsecured creditors recovered over twenty-seven
cents on the dollar in assignment liquidations, over ten cents on the dollar in involun-
tary bankruptcy liquidations, and about six and one-half cents on the dollar in volun-
tary bankruptcy cases. By 1976, the average recovery in all bankruptcy cases had fallen
to less than one cent on the dollar.
Id. at 18-19.
46. Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Require-
ment: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 N.w. U.L. REV. 919, 949-50 (1991). See also
Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 FLA. L. REV. 329, 332 (arguing that the purpose
of bankruptcy law is an attempt to reverse the flow of "disorder of certain types of systems-
troubled firms- and return them to viability").
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ruptcy "is and should be designed to address a broad range of interests
affected by the collapse of a debtor enterprise. '47
This Article is not concerned with weighing the relative merit of
these or other views 48 of bankruptcy policy. Whichever academic per-
spective is correct, the reality is a predominate view that favors reha-
bilitating financially distressed businesses and allowing them a second
chance to compete in the marketplace. Although rehabilitation is not,
of itself, a misguided approach - indeed, the Code's legislative history
expresses a preference for it49 - the rehabilitation policy can be used
to such an extreme that enforcing the substance of the Code becomes
a matter of secondary importance.
III. BANKRUPTCY REALITY
All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others.50
A. The Supremacy of Security
In the discussion of bankruptcy policy above, use of the term "credi-
tors" was oversimplified, making no distinction between those that are
secured and those with only unsecured claims. In reality, of course,
this distinction is extremely important because secured claims will be
paid first and the extent of the secured creditor's interest in the
debtor's collateral will determine whether and to what extent un-
secured creditors will be paid. This general scheme holds true in
bankruptcy and under the various states' laws.
The fairness of separating secured from unsecured creditors and
preferring the former is usually justified by arguments that secured
credit serves a greater good that produces benefits to unsecured credi-
tors, and the assumption that all affected creditors have consented to
their status. The validity of both of these justifications is subject to
much academic debate, leading to the fair conclusion that the jury is
still out on the issue. Congress, at least through its last major revision
of the bankruptcy laws in 1978, attempted to strike some balance be-
47. Ponoroff, supra note 46, at 960-61.
48. See generally John M. Czarnetsky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate Reorgani-
zations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939 (1999) (describing other policy perspectives).
49. The legislative history states that the goal of Chapter 11 is:
[t]o restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its
employees with jobs. pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The
premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the
industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold
for scrap.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1997), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
50. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1982) (1954).
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tween recognition of the increased acceptance and use of security on
the one hand, and the need to protect the interests of the unsecured
creditor body in bankruptcy, on the other.5 1 The history of bank-
ruptcy reform reveals that Congress is less interested in striking a fair
balance between secured and unsecured creditors than it once might
have been; indeed, bankruptcy reform has at no time questioned the
supremacy of security and has even expanded the secured creditor's
rights in certain transactions. 52
The debate over security's supremacy is extensive and robust.5
3
Professor Warren offers this summary of the debate:
The rhetoric of the debate over security interests is couched largely
in the language of economics. Will a priority scheme make lending
more efficient? Will it promote more lending? Will it cause over-
investment in risky projects? Will a modified priority scheme en-
courage greater internalization of risk? Do externalities caused by
a full priority scheme undercut any efficiencies it might produce?
51. In the past, distribution to unsecured creditors was not so directly dependent upon the
extent of security because courts were more hostile toward secured transactions than they are
today. See, e.g., G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 6-9 (2001); William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist and Secured
Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 1511, 1516-20 (1997).
52. Lien-stripping in Chapter 13, for example, is limited under bankruptcy reform. The Code
requires Chapter 13 debtors to pay in full the value of collateral, but any deficiency is treated as
a general unsecured claim. Bankruptcy reform requires payment at the contract rate for any
collateral acquired within a year before the bankruptcy was filed and, if the collateral is a motor
vehicle, the lookback period is two and one-half years. For a general discussion of this change,
see Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and
Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415 (1999), but note that Norberg's
discussion addresses this lien-stripping provision when the lookback period was five years for all
types of collateral, which was shortened in the 107th Congress.
53. For a comprehensive collection of authority on the security debate, see, e.g., Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
105 YALE L.J. 857, 934 n.22-23 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997) (arguing security creates benefits for
unsecured creditors by increasing liquidity, allowing the financially distressed debtor to avoid
bankruptcy, and increasing distribution to unsecured creditors in the event of bankruptcy);
Lopucki, Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1963 (1994) (arguing that "[a]rticle
9 artificially and unjustifiably advantages the institution of security over unsecurity."); Robert E.
Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436 (1997); Warner, supra note
51, at 81; (arguing revised Article 9 is designed to allow secured lenders to escape burdens of the
Code); Charles W. Hendricks, Offering Tort Victims Some Solace: Why States Should Incorporate
a 20% Set-Aside into Their Versions of Article 9, 104 CoM. L.J. 265 (1999); Robert E. Scott, The
Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1788 n.13 (1994) (collections of citations on efficiency
debate) [hereinafter Politics of Article 9]; Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring
the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims Subordinating Security Interests in Bank-
ruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1371 (arguments of "unfairness" find no support); Woodward,
82 CORNELL L. REV.1511 (1997); Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L.
REV. 851 (1999) (arguing the security debate does not properly take account of constitutional
issues under the Takings Clause).
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There can be no doubt that economic analysis provides a valuable
tool in analyzing the implications of any rule in commercial law,
including a rule regarding the priority of secured debt...
Debates over priority are not new. Professor Schwartz revived an
old debate in the newly discovered language of law and economics
by asking whether secured debt is efficient. In quick order, a cot-
tage industry of articles rising to the challenge of disputing its basic
assumptions arose.
Professor LoPucki noted that economists spend a great deal of time
explaining why any rule that aims to redistribute wealth to the un-
derdog would actually reduce wealth to everyone. These econo-
mists explain the need for banks to be able to seize all the assets of a
business while the tort victims limp away with nothing, as based on
allocative efficiency. LoPucki comments: "Ah, to be exquisitely
cruel but at the same time efficient - what more could an economist
ask of an institution?"
The conflict between efficient outcomes and distributive conse-
quences goes well beyond the Article 9 debates, with warring camps
looking at their opposing numbers with sneers of derision. The spe-
cial contribution of Professor LoPucki, Professor Bebchuk, and Mr.
Fried has been to establish that the theoretical debate needed a
much larger framework than simply figuring out why secured credit
was efficient and why it should therefore always take precedence
over distributional concerns. They forcefully point out that the her-
alded efficiencies of secured credit might themselves be suspect. In-
deed, they push the point further, noting that there might be serious
inefficiencies created by a full priority scheme for secured creditors.
Their scholarship sets the stage for a heretical question: If the se-
cured credit system might be both inefficient and distributionally
suspect, perhaps the time has come to revisit its premier place in the
commercial world. 5
4
Professor Warren captures the dual nature of the security debate;
whether security is efficient in the first place and, even assuming it is,
whether Article 9 should nevertheless incorporate some measure of
normative considerations. The latter is a question of procedural fair-
ness and a challenge to the notion that an efficient system is superior
to all others.55
54. Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority
Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1377-80 (1997).
55. That efficiency can and should give way to normative considerations is hardly a novel
concept. Our criminal justice system is inefficient, but we accept that the inefficiency is neces-
sary to ensure justice is properly done. More to the point of this Article, Chapter 11 is, at least
conceptually, a normative construct, as reflected in the policy that Chapter ll's primary goal is
to give financially troubled businesses a chance to recover. Notwithstanding its unimpressive
success rate, even the most strident free-market thinkers support Chapter 11 and its rehabilita-
tion policy. In a Washington Times editorial, for example, Daniel Mitchell, the McKenna fellow
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The normative challenge to security looks at the consequences of
permitting debtors to redistribute their wealth, transferring value
away from unsecured creditors, especially involuntary creditors, such
as tort claimants, 56 as well as "reluctant" 57 creditors, who are least
able to protect themselves, to "lenders who are entirely voluntary,
best able to protect their rights, and best able to spread their risks
among numerous projects. s58 Put another way:
A borrower may distribute dangerous products that cause injury,
fail to pay its employees, or fail to make required payments into the
employees' pension funds. That business's secured lender, though,
provided it followed the rules, will be paid from the borrower's as-
sets before the tort claimants or employees get anything.59
In the worst cases, debtors can render themselves judgment proof, in-
sulating themselves from liability while continuing to operate.60
The consequences that this system requires tort victims, employees,
and other involuntary creditors to bear cannot be understated. The
state law secured financing regime places these creditors at a distinct
disadvantage in terms of recovery, a disadvantage that the Bankruptcy
in political economy with the conservative Heritage Foundation, touted the virtues of Chapter
11, and, in conclusion, stated:
Ronald Reagan once summed up the big government view of the economy like this: "If
it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops moving, subsidize it."
He was right. Let companies compete to win, and avoid the temptation to interfere
when they fail.
Daniel J. Mitchell, Two Cheers for Bankruptcy, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at A17. The rich
irony of this statement - Chapter 11 is governmental interference with business failure, after all
- is beyond the scope of this Article. But it does illustrate that the rehabilitation policy of
Chapter 11 enjoys broad support.
56. Other claimants who would be classed as involuntary would include former spouses and
children who are owed domestic support, governmental agencies including taxing authorities,
utility companies, defrauded creditors, or victims of antitrust violations, unfair competition, and
patent, trademark and copyright infringement. LoPucki, supra note 53 at1896-97 (1994).
57. Id. at 1896. Professor LoPucki divides the voluntary unsecured creditors into two camps,
the "asset-based" unsecured lender and the "cash-flow surfers." He argues that the asset-based
unsecured creditor is typically large and sophisticated, dealing with debtors of comparable size
and sophistication, and, as such, is protected largely to the same extent as the secured lender. Id.
at 1924-30. The more common cash-flow surfers, "expect to be paid in the ordinary course of
business from the secured creditor's collateral, particularly the debtor's usually fully encumbered
bank account." Id. at 1938. The secured creditor can interrupt this cash flow "at its whim," by
enforcing an agreement between it and the debtor, an agreement to which the unsecured credi-
tor was not a party. Id. at 1939. These creditors are also referred to as "occasional" creditors,
Politics of Article 9, supra note 53, at 1794, "nonadjusting creditors," Bebchuk, supra note 53(in-
cluding involuntary creditors within the term, or similar self-describing types of terms).
58. Warren, supra note 54, at 1389.
59. William J. Woodward, Jr., Private Legislation in the United States - How the Uniform
Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 451, 463 (1999).
60. Death of Liability, supra n. 45 at 4. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE
L.J. 1, 4 (1996).
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Code fully recognizes. Once a bankruptcy is filed, the reluctant and
involuntary creditors' dilemma is often exacerbated, despite any pro-
tections the Code is supposed to provide. 6' Any action these creditors
could have taken outside of bankruptcy will be automatically stayed
and, as will be discussed below, the debtor's management can so con-
trol the outcome of the bankruptcy case that these claimants have lit-
tle ability to assert their rights.62  This is no small matter because
there are literally thousands63 of involuntary creditors with claims in
pending bankruptcy cases right now, including individuals injured by
defective products and the employees, retirees and investors caught
up in the record breaking64 - and, as with Enron, WorldCom and their
ilk, scandal-ridden - business bankruptcy cases.
Although efficiency alone is insufficient to justify Article 9 and se-
cured transactions among academics, it is the cornerstone of Article 9
itself. The original drafters wanted "to provide a simple and unified
structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured fi-
nancing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater
certainty. '65 Indeed, it is because of Article 9's emphasis on efficiency
and simplicity that issues concerning distributional consequences have
arisen.
Yet, despite the debate and compelling arguments challenging the
supremacy of security, the recent revision to Article 9, which has been
adopted in every state, actually expands the secured creditor's power
61. See infra, note 88 and accompanying text.
62. See infra section II.B..
63. There is no doubt that the Enrons and WorldComs of the 2002 bankruptcy saga have
caused thousands of claims for employees and retirees. Asbestos cases, as well, have produced
thousands of claims. For instance, when Owens Corning, producer of asbestos-containing high-
temperature pipe coating, filed for bankruptcy with the numbers of asbestos claims growing and
the funds becoming inadequate. The asbestos containing material was present in 90% of Ameri-
can homes. Fiberglass Information Network, Owens Corning Declares Bankruptcy, available at
http://www.sustainableenterprises.com/fin/News/bankrupt.htm. Of course, homeowners may
never even realize that they have claims against Owens Corning or any other company produc-
ing asbestos or using it in its products. In 2002, when the Environmental Protection Agency was
ready to make a public announcement to the American people that the insulation in their attics
may be contaminated by asbestos, the White House intervened and the warning was never made.
Andrew Schneider, White House Thwarted EPA's Absestos Insulation Warning, SEAITLE TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2002, seattletimes.com.
64. See, e.g., Dena Aubin, Fraud Figures Heavily as Bankruptcies Soar, THE SAN DIEGO
UNION- TRll. Dec. 31, 2002, at C-3. To put 2002 in better perspective, the Kmart case, filed in
early 2002, was the sixth largest when filed; by year-end, it was no longer even in the top ten.
Michael Arndt, Tie Bankruptcy Run Isn't Slowing, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 13, 2003, at 36. Even more
eye-popping is that the assets of bankrupt companies in 2001-02 exceed the combined assets of
every business bankruptcy in the previous decade. The Year of the Falling Companies, HOUS.
CHRON., Jan. 2. 2003, at 1.
65. LoPucki, Death of Liability, supra note 45 60, atl8.
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over the debtor's assets.66 Moreover, certain provisions of revised Ar-
ticle 9 appear designed specifically to defeat Code sections that actu-
ally do disadvantage secured creditors. 67 As Professor Warner has
speculated,68 revised Article 9 produces several general themes, all of
which work to the detriment of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy:
First, revised Article 9 rejects the notion that any assets should be
"carved out" of the reach of secured credit in order to preserve
some free assets to either fund a reorganization effort or to insure
some minimum recovery for unsecured creditors. 69 Second, the re-
vision drastically curtails the trustee's ability to use the bankruptcy
strong-arm power to avoid security interests. Third, with respect to
income producing assets, the revision provides a mechanism for opt-
ing out of the bankruptcy regime entirely. Fourth, the revision di-
verts the enterprise's reorganization value to the secured creditor.
Finally, the revision hampers the debtor's ability to reorganize by
giving greater control over that process to the secured creditor.
70
A question that should immediately spring to mind is how security
could have been so expanded under revised Article 9 in the face of
legitimate scholarly debate regarding the supremacy of secured credit.
The answer lies, at least in part, in the process by which uniform laws
like Article 9 are created, revised and enacted.71 Despite its reputa-
66. See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 344-46 (1999), which summarizes Article 9's revisions as follows:
Even more important [than a disparity among classes of creditors in transitional costs],
though, is the tendency of revised Article 9 to favor secured lenders over trade credi-
tors and other unsecured creditors. The original U.C.C. moved far in that direction, in
part by unifying a messy and complex field of law, in part by abrogating the pre-Code
rights of unsecured creditors, and in part by making possible the ready use of floating
liens and blanket liens. The new Article 9 pushes further that way. It expands the
possible scope of security interests to include, among other things, deposit accounts,
payment intangibles, commercial tort claims, health care receivables, and most consign-
ments. It eases perfection rules. It lowers costs by doing away with most occasions for
multiple filings. It clarifies the rules about filing locations, thus reducing the number of
multistate filings.
Just as important are the things it does not do. It makes only modest improvements in
the lot of the consumer-debtor, rolling back some helpful changes in earlier drafts.
Though a good many commentators of a wide range of political stances have urged that
involuntary tort claimants be given enhanced priority, this was not done. The Article 9
committee also lobbied for the reversal of a proposed change in Article 2, which would
have improved the status of a reclaiming seller; the Article 2 committee acceded.
Id.
67. See generally, Warner, supra note 51.
68. Id. "[I]t is hazardous to predict in advance the bankruptcy impact of revised Article 9....
[Because] the extent to which the changes in revised Article 9 will have these effects turns on a
number of factors," notably judicial construction of the revised Article's language. Id. at 24.
69. Indeed, when the "carve-out" was proposed, it was greeted with hostility and unanimously
rejected. Woodward, supra note 51.
70. Warner, supra note 51, at 24..
71. See Politics of Article 9, supra note 53, at 1803-07 (providing a description of this process.).
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tion as a "pure" process 72 that relies on experienced practitioners and
academics with particular expertise on a given subject, special inter-
ests nevertheless tend to heavily influence the final product.73 Indeed,
this influence partly derives from the very structure - reliance on ex-
perts - that gives the U.C.C. its perceived intellectual superiority.74 In
his examination of the Article 9 Study Group,75 Dean Scott observed:
72. See generally Norman I. Silber, Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Substance Abuse at UCC Drafting Sessions, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 225 (1997) (providing an enter-
taining examination of the purity of the U.C.C. process). Although the UCC process is certainly
not truly "pure," it certainly does seem more constrained than that involved in non-UCC law.
Outside of the UCC, corporate interests have instituted a rather alarming mechanism by which
they seek to have their interests enacted into law at the state level. In a critical discussion, Karen
Olsson tells of an organization called the American Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC"),
which she describes as:
a year-round clearinghouse for business-friendly legislation. Its nine task forces, each
composed of legislators and representatives from private industry, sit down together to
draft model bills on issues ranging from agriculture to school vouchers, which are then
introduced in state legislatures across the country.
Though it calls itself "the nation's largest bipartisan, individual membership associa-
tion of state legislators," ALEC might better be described as one of the nation's most
powerful - and least known - corporate lobbies. While other lobbyists focus on the
federal government, ALEC gives business a direct hand in writing bills that are consid-
ered in state assemblies nationwide. Funded primarily by large corporations, industry
groups, and conservative foundations - including R.J. Reynolds, Koch Industries, and
the American Petroleum Institute - the group takes a chain-restaurant approach to
public policy, supplying precooked McBills to state lawmakers. Since most legislators
are in session only part of the year and often have no staff to do independent research,
they're quick to swallow what ALEC serves up. In 2000, according to the council, mem-
bers introduced more than 3,100 bills based on its models, passing 450 into law.
As Jones points out, ALEC's critics justifiably charge the group with an unacceptable attempt at
stealthy involvement: legislation drafted by corporate interests, reaching various areas including
deregulation of utilities, limitations on class actions and tort liability, and reducing or eliminating
the minimum wage, is introduced without ALEC's fingerprints. Enron was among ALEC's past
corporate donors, and its membership "includes speakers, presidents, and majority and minority
leaders in 22 senates and 30 houses" across the country.
Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the Law, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct., 2002, at http//
:www.motherjones.com/news/outfront/2002/37/ma 95_Ot.html.
73. Politics of Article 9, supra note 53, at 1828 ("the distributional effects [of Article 9's choice
of law provisions] clearly favor those classes of secured creditors - general financers, and other
primary lenders - who have and continue to exercise the greatest influence over the Article 9
revision process"). See also, Woodward, supra note 51(describing hostile response and uniform
rejection of Professor Warren's suggestion of a 20% carve-out).
74. See e.g., James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2096, 2097 (1991) ("The
principal argument that the Commissioners can make on behalf of a uniform law when it is
considered by a state legislature is its technical and substantive superiority over a law born in the
back room of a state legislature and sired by a lobbying organization.").
75. A study group is appointed if the Permanent Editorial Board for the Code and the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Director ex officio agree to prepare a report for revisions of the Code. Here
Dean Scott explains the nature and make up of the study groups:
Study groups tend to have academics serving as chief reporters, with other academics
and practitioners serving as members. In addition, study groups seek out advice from
groups or individuals who have some interest or stake in the revisions at hand. The
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The principal currency in the Study Group, therefore, is technical
expertise. Moreover, all expertise is not equally valued. Although
academic insights into the structure and social effects of Article 9
are recognized as important, encyclopedic knowledge of how the
rules have been interpreted by different courts is valued more
highly, and the greatest asset is knowledge of how the rules "really
work" in practice. This hierarchy of expertise is not irrational, given
the operating assumption of the ALI and NCCUSL approach. 76
On the other hand, the privileged status of "hands on" working
knowledge of Article 9 rules has dramatic effects on the dynamics of
Study Group deliberations. Most significantly, in-house counsel for
banks and finance companies and private commercial lawyers
whose practice involves representation of those interests provide
the most important source of expertise concerning the nature and
effects of proposed revisions to Article 9.77
Industry bias is even more pronounced with respect to enacting the
final product, and "wide enactment of uniform laws often requires in-
dustry support, and is impossible to accomplish in the face of industry
opposition.' 78 The need to create text that is capable of being enacted
in the various states is the uniform law process's most constraining
feature. 79 Since the Uniform Commercial Code, by definition, re-
quires uniformity of enactment, controversial proposals, or those in-
volving sweeping changes to the status quo, are disfavored. Affected
industries that view a draft as unfavorable can successfully exercise
their influence by threatening to mount a concerted effort in opposi-
tion in only a few key states.80
In the end, of course, efficiency and the belief in the inherent good-
ness of Article 9 prevailed over normative considerations, and the re-
vision was enacted in almost every state by the hoped-for effective
date of July 1, 2001,81 and the few dilatory states soon followed suit.82
study group as a whole has the final say as to the draft report's contents. After com-
pleting their reports, study groups, which tend to meet two to three times a year, send
their products on to both the ALI [American Law Institute] and the NCCUSL [Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws].
Politics of Article 9, supra note 53, at 1804-05.
76. Here, Dean Scott refers to the American Law Institute ("ALl") and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), both of which "believe that their
function is to deal with technical problems that can be resolved by legal expertise and to avoid
issues whose resolution requires controversial value choices." Id. at 1805-06..
77. Id. at 1808-09. Dean Scott cautions, however, against sole reliance on impressionistic ob-
servations. Id. at 1809.
78. Id. at 1820.
79. Woodward, supra note 51, at 1521-22.
80. Id. at 1521-26.
81. Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, States
Uniformly Enact UCC9 Revisions (Jul. 1, 2001), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/
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All through the process, bankruptcy reform was pending before Con-
gress. Despite having once attempted to ameliorate the effect of se-
curity on the collective process in bankruptcy, 83 Congress has largely
ignored any problem revised Article 9 might create in bankruptcy, in-
cluding the extent to which security precludes distribution to un-
secured creditors, or the manner in which specific Code protections
are rendered effectively superfluous.8 4
Distribution to unsecured creditors depends almost entirely on the
existence of unencumbered assets. Indeed, it is not unusual that se-
curity is so all-encompassing that no distribution is possible.85  In
these cases, the Code's protections for unsecured creditors are, quite
simply, meaningless. For example, § 507(a) of the Code acknowledges
the particular vulnerability of involuntary creditors86 and requires that
certain classes of these creditors be paid before general unsecured
creditors receive any distribution. Of course, if the debtor's assets are
fully collateralized, the priority status accorded these creditors is of no
value at all.
Moreover, as is discussed next, even where there are unencumbered
assets, it is far from a foregone conclusion that creditors will receive
meaningful distribution, or even fair treatment, once the bankruptcy
case has been commenced.
prl-07-01.asp [hereinafter July 1 Press Release]. The NCCUSL deemed the quick and nearly
uniform enactment "an amazing success story," that included "an intensive educational compo-
nent ... spearheaded by members of the American Bar Association Business Law Section and
the American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers." Indeed, the NCCUSL, citing Article
9's Official Comments, warned of the horrendous complications that would follow in states that
did not timely enact the revision. Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Report Now Available Analyzing Choice of Law Issues For States That
Will Not Have Revised UCC Article 9 in Effect by July 1, 2001 (Jun. 15, 2001), at http://
www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/prl-06-15.asp.
82. In Connecticut, the revision was effective October 1, 2001, and in Alabama, Florida and
Mississippi, the revision took effect on January 1, 2002. Jul. 1 Press Release, supra note 81.
83. See supra note 51.
84. Even if Congress showed an inclination to consider the effect of revised Article 9 in bank-
ruptcy as part of its overall effort to reform the Code, "financial institutions no doubt would
argue before Congress that sound policy (including distributional policy) was already set by na-
tional experts in the Article 9 process and it would be wasteful to revisit the issues." Woodward,
supra note 51, at 1531 n.99.
85. See e.g., LoPucki, supra note 60, at 18-19. Compounding this situation is the fact that even
where a debtor enters bankruptcy with unencumbered assets; unsecured creditors are deprived
of the value of those assets when the debtor's post-petition financer requires that a security
interest be granted as a condition to providing funds. it U.S.C. § 364(c) (2003).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2003). Among the types of debt afforded priority under § 507(a) are
past due wages, certain retirement benefits, consumer deposits, alimony and child support, and
taxes. Plainly, none of these debts would arise from a normal debtor-creditor transaction in
which the creditor voluntarily extends credit in exchange for even nominal consideration.
[Vol. 1:361
2003] BANKRUPTCY REFORM
B. Concentrated Control in the Hands of the Debtor
A chief criticism of Chapter 11 business cases is that too much
power over the reorganization process is vested in the debtor, result-
ing in delay, excessive costs, and other problems.8 7  As discussed
above, the ease with which the debtor can transfer wealth to preferred
lenders through security can make the bankruptcy itself a meaningless
endeavor from the unsecured creditors' vantage point.88 In addition
to wealth transfer through securitization, debtors are armed with sig-
nificant express powers that put them in the driver's seat at the earli-
est and most critical stages of the bankruptcy.
Indeed, debtor control begins even before commencement of the
case because it is the debtor who determines where the bankruptcy
case will be filed. 89 Section 1408 of title 28 permits the debtor to file
its bankruptcy case where its principal assets or principal place of bus-
iness are located, or in the debtor's state of residence or domicile.90
Because "residence or domicile" has been interpreted to include the
debtor's state of incorporation, 9' the case can proceed in a state where
the debtor has no physical presence, other than the documents that
created it. The affiliate rule 92 expands debtor choice even further.
Under this rule the bankruptcy of an eligible subsidiary can first be
filed in the desired district and, based on that debtor's properly
87. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda For Basic Reform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J.
573.(1995).
88. Excessive security can also make bankruptcy impossible for the debtor. Because Chapter
11 is funded through unencumbered assets, which includes compensation of the debtor's attor-
ney and other professionals, "even a viable debtor may find it impossible to obtain the profes-
sional services necessary to reorganize." LoPucki, supra note 87, at 579
89. This statement assumes the bankruptcy is voluntarily filed, as is true for the majority of
bankruptcies. Even if creditors file an involuntary petition, the debtor may move to transfer
venue in the interests of justice or for the convenience of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1412
(2003), FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2003). The statute provides:
Except as provided in section 1410 of this title [venue of cases ancillary to foreign pro-
ceedings], a case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court for the district -
(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the United States, or
principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity that is the subject of such
case have been located for the one hundred and eighty days immediately preceding
such commencement, or for a longer portion of such one-hundred-and-eighty-day pe-
riod than the domicile, residence, or principal place of business, in the United States, or
principal assets in the United States, of such person were located in any other district;
or
(2) in which there is pending a case under title 11 concerning such person's affiliate,
general partner, or partnership.
91. See, e.g., Pa. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Charter Abstract Corp., 790 F.Supp 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
In re FRG, 107 B.R. 461, 471 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1989); In re Spicer Oaks Apartments, Ltd., 80
B.R. 142, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2003).
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venued case, the parent's bankruptcy petition can be filed in the same
district.93 Used strategically, the affiliate rule not only allows a case
to proceed in a state with which the debtor has no connection, other
than corporate affiliation, but can also destroy a healthy company94
for the sake of obtaining the preferred venue.95
The venue choices available to debtors, of course, can easily lead to
an impermissible degree of forum shopping. Theoretically, bank-
ruptcy law should be uniformly applied throughout the nation's bank-
ruptcy courts, but in practice, courts differ in their interpretations of
the Code. Selecting a court strategically to exploit those differences
"can have an important effect on the distribution of the losses emanat-
ing from a bankruptcy reorganization. '96 For example, a debtor fac-
ing mass tort liability to which the debtor's officers and directors may
also be exposed would likely seek to avoid judicial districts in which
so-called third party releases as components of the reorganization
plan are prohibited.97 Strategic use of venue selection in this regard
would allow non-debtors to evade their liability to injured tort claim-
ants, even where egregiously wrongful conduct is involved.98
A debtor may also strategically select a court that places considera-
ble distance between it and significant numbers of its creditors. That
93. Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of
Venue Choice in Large Chapter I! Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 967, 985 n.52 (1999). A
good example is the Enron bankruptcy, which involved 28 affiliated debtors in what we refer to
collectively as "Enron's bankruptcy" was filed. The first petition was filed by an entity known as
Enron Metals & Commodity Corp., which, although incorporated in Delaware, had its principal
place of business and most of its employees in New York. Id. Through the affiliate rule, the
remaining 27 petitions could be filed in New York as well, despite the fact that 26 of them,
including parent Enron Corp., had their principal place of business, principal assets, executives
and officers, and (unshredded) business records in Houston, Texas. In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R.
327, 338-39 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2002). Id.
94. Insolvency is not a requirement for Chapter 11 eligibility. See Randal C. Picker, Contem-
porary Issues in Bankruptcy and Corporate Law: Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors' Bargain,
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 519 (1992) (discussing ease with which voluntary Chapter 11 petitions may be
filed). See also, Anne M. Burr, Unproposed Solution to Chapter I/ Reform: Assessing Manage-
ment Responsibility for Business Failures, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 113, 130-32 (1994) (comparing
petition requirements under the current Code and its predecessor) [hereinafter Unproposed
Solution].
95. A prominent example of the use of the affiliate rule is Eastern Airlines. Eastern, a Miami
based corporation, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York through the use of
one of its subsidiaries, lonsphere Clubs. lonsphere was insolvent when it filed and represented
only a tiny fraction of Eastern's assets (it ran Eastern's hospitality suites for its frequent fliers).
Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by
Insolvent Corporations, 94 N.w. U. L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2000).
96. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 11, 13 (1991).
97. See infra note 145-49 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 149.
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distance serves to disadvantage creditors, especially employees, con-
sumers, or small trade creditors who lack the resources to fully vindi-
cate their rights. In large, complex cases, this argument loses some of
its force because the disadvantage by distance argument would be pre-
sent wherever the case is ultimately sited for all but the largest institu-
tional creditors. 99
In other cases, however, the debtor's venue choice is so far removed
from its operations that an inference of abuse, or at least impropriety,
arises. 100 For example, in the fall of 1998, Sun TV, an electronics and
appliance retailer, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in Delaware.
Other than having incorporated in Delaware, Sun TV had no nexus
with that state. Instead, its headquarters, real estate, and the majority
of its operations were in Ohio. Two months after filing its Chapter 11
petition, the Sun TV case was converted to Chapter 7, and the com-
pany was liquidated. In the meantime, customers of Sun TV had a
difficult time getting answers, let alone property they had purchased
or money on their claims, from Sun TV.101 In the end, Sun TV's se-
cured creditors ended up with the money consumers used to pay for
goods, and the goods many of those consumers purchased.10 2 As un-
secured creditors, affected consumers got nothing even though the
Code blessed them with priority status, 0 3 and, as the successful bidder
99. In the Enron case, supra note 93, Houston appears to be a more logical venue because of
the location of the companies' assets, employees and documents. However, even if the bank-
ruptcy proceeded in Houston, creditors, including workers, retirees, and small trade creditors,
would still be disadvantaged.
100. A party in interest can object to the debtor's chosen venue and move for a transfer of the
case under § 1404 of title 28. 28 U.S.C. §1404 (2003). However, as discussed below, the factors
courts use to determine whether a case should be transferred tend to tilt in favor of the debtor's
chosen venue. See infra n. 105-10 and accompanying text.
101. Mike Pramik, Customers Left to Worry About Goods, Warranties, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Nov. 8, 1998, at 01C.
102. Id. We can only speculate, but Sun TV's secured creditors probably had security inter-
ests in both proceeds and inventory.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (2003). This section grants priority status to:
allowed unsecured claims of individuals, to the extent of $2,100 for each such individ-
ual, arising from the deposit, before the commencement of the case, of money in con-
nection with the purchase, lease, or rental of property, or the purchase of services, for
the personal, family, or household use of such individuals, that were not delivered or
provided.
Id. By its plain language, this priority would encompass the goods Sun TV's customers pur-
chased but which were not delivered, and may also encompass the extended warranties many of
Sun TV's consumer creditors had purchased. See e.g., In reTart's T.V. Furniture & Appliance
Co., 165 B.R. 171 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1991).
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in an auction of Sun TV's assets, the company's founder was able to
reclaim a number of its stores. 10 4
A properly venued case can, of course, be transferred to another
venue in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties, 10 5
but the courts' standards for considering such motions make transfer
unlikely. Unlike the liberal choices granted the debtor under the
venue statute,106 courts approach motions to transfer with great cau-
tion. 10 7 In addition, among the various factors courts consider when
determining whether to transfer venue, s08 the economic and efficient
administration of the estate is held to be of paramount concern, 10 9 and
this includes a court's investment of resources in the case at its earliest
stages. Where a debtor files along with its bankruptcy petition any
number of "first day" and emergency motions, which is not uncom-
mon, the debtor's court of choice necessarily becomes invested in the
case before all but the largest of creditors have even received their
official notification that the case has commenced. 110 Thus, just as the
initial choice of venue may be a strategic one for the debtor, so, too,
can be its conduct once the case is commenced in ensuring the case
remains in the debtor's preferred court.
104. Brian R. Ball, Sun TV's Founder Wins Bid to Take Back 18 Store Sites, Bus. FIRST OF
COLUMBUS, Jan. 8, 1999, at http://columbus.bizjournals.com/columbus/stories/1999/O1/11/
story2.html.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (2003); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a) (2003).
106. Note that the liberality of interpreting the venue statute does not extend to consumer
cases where the debtor's place of employment may be his preferred district for filing. In In re
McDonald, 219 B.R. 804 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1998), for example, the court transferred a case
from the Western District of Tennessee because the debtor resided in Arkansas. However, the
debtor worked in Tennessee, and his chosen venue was only a short distance for both the debtor
and his counsel, while the Arkansas bankruptcy court required more than an hour's drive time.
Siding with the majority of courts, the McDonald court held the debtor's place of employment
does not equate to the "place of business" for venue purposes. Id. at 805. See also In re Berry-
hill, 182 B.R. 29, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn 1995) (citing cases).
107. See, e.g., In re Enron, 274 B.R. at 342 (motions to transfer venue are "not to be taken
lightly" and the "debtor's choice of forum is entitled to great weight if venue is proper").
108. In reCommonwealth Oil Refining Co., 596 F.2d 1239, 1247 (5th Cir. 1979). The court
here held the general considerations for transfer of venue are the interest of justice and the
convenience of the parties. Under the "convenience of the parties" the factors to be considered
are:
1) The proximity of creditors of every kind to the court;
2) The proximity of the bankrupt (debtor) to the court;
3) The proximity of the witnesses necessary to the administration of the estate;
4) The location of the assets;
5) The economic administration of the estate;
6) The necessity of ancillary administration if bankruptcy should result.
109. Id. See In re Enron, 274 B.R. at 348.
110. See, e.g., Patricia L. Barsalou & Zach Mosner, Preferential First Day Orders: Same Ques-
tion Different Look, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 8, 7t.
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Once a case is filed, various Code provisions combine to allow debt-
ors to chart the course of their bankruptcies, which may not be consis-
tent with the best interests of their creditors. Unlike other national
bankruptcy systems, 1 ' the American Code permits the debtor's
prepetition management to continue operating the business as debtor
in possession in Chapter 11. As with venue, there is a presumption
favoring continued debtor in possession operation and, although trust-
ees may be appointed, courts have shown reluctance in doing so. The
theory behind the debtor in possession is that those most familiar with
the business should continue its operation." 12
As this part will show, the debtor in possession concept is replete
with criticism. 1 3 In the first place, there is no mechanism in Chapter
11 to weed out cases in which poor management caused the financial
distress,1 14 and poor management, alone, is insufficient to warrant ap-
pointment of a trustee. 1 5 Studies have shown that the Chapter 11
process takes longer when the debtor in possession continues to oper-
ate the business,11 6 and management can strategically use delay to ex-
tract concessions from creditors.' 1 7
111. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Is Chapter 11 Too Favorable to Debt-
ors? Evidence From Abroad, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1532, 1534 ("The United States is probably the
only developed nation that leaves the debtor in unsupervised possession of the estate during a
reorganization") (quoting Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter I/: An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 573, 576-77 (1995)) (providing criticism of debtor in possession concept).
112. In re La Sherene, Inc., 3 B.R. 169, 174 (Bankr. Ga. 1980) ("The presumption arises from
a belief that the debtor and current management are generally best suited to orchestrate the
process of rehabilitation for the benefit for creditors and other interests of the estate.").
113. See e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor In Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code? Second Installment, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983) [hereinafter
Systems Failure]; Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the
Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion
Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1995) (presenting and analyzing the following criticisms: that the
existing officers and management caused the very financial distress that precipitated the bank-
ruptcy case, the concept that the management of some public corporations is not always a signifi-
cant owner of the capital stock of the corporation and will be indifferent to the interests of
stockholders, and that the concept is of the debtor in possession is flawed because there is no
independent party responsible for advancing the reorganization on an expeditious basis, thus the
debtor in possession carries too many duties to be effective); Edward S. Adams, Governance in
Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 583
(1993) (criticizing the Code for inadequately constraining debtor in possession indiscretions with
respect to Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions); George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation
of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993) (arguing that no coherent the-
ory informs judicial determinations over debtor-in-possession financing).
114. Systems Failure, supra note 113, at 263 ("There is a broad consensus among students of
business failure that the large majority of businesses which fail do so because of poor
management.").
115. Unproposed Solution, supra note 94, at 136.
116. Systems Failure, supra note 113.
117. Unproposed Solution, supra note 94, at 136.
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Chapter 11 incentives are also skewed against creditors:
Arguably, in a capitalist system the market should provide the func-
tion of disciplining management without the need for legislation.
However, a corporation which files for relief under Chapter 11 is
shielded from the effects of the market. Furthermore, under Chap-
ter 11, a corporation can seek such protection from the market irre-
spective of its financial status and may extend such protection
indefinitely. Thus, corporate management is able to take unneces-
sary risks with the assets of a corporation. When those risks are
successful they inure to the benefit of management, but when the
risks are unsuccessful they are spread among the creditor body.1" 8
Indeed, it may be difficult for parties in interest to even assess the
risks undertaken by management. Not only are courts hesitant to in-
terfere with the day-to-day business decision-making,' 19 but there may
also be obstacles to obtaining the information necessary to assess the
decisions actually being made.120 The debtor in possession may be
reluctant to share certain information, requiring either creditor con-
cessions 12' or costly judicial intervention.
Moreover, even though the debtor in possession serves in a fiduci-
ary capacity with respect to the bankruptcy estate and its creditors, the
fiduciary obligations imposed on management provide illusory protec-
tion because of inherent conflicts with management's duty to share-
holders, 22 or its own self-serving interest. 23 Worse still, at least one
commentator has argued that management control of the reorganiza-
118. Id. at 145-46.
119. Id. at n.222.
120. Professors Betkar, Ferris and Lawless noted the decrease in available information result-
ing from a bankruptcy filing:
A bankruptcy filing exacerbates the normal information asymmetries that exist be-
tween management and the firm's external claimants. Market valuations often disap-
pear as stock exchanges delist bankrupt firms' stock or the market trades the stock
thinly. Firms in bankruptcy often cease reporting audited financial statements and in-
stead offer unaudited reports generated by management. Also, the management of a
firm in bankruptcy even may delay the filing of mandated SEC reports or the holding
of periodic shareholders' meetings.
Periodic financial reporting required by the Code does not come close to solving the
information asymmetries. There generally is no requirement that these reports be cer-
tified as accurate by a third party such as an auditor. Hence, these reports are no more
credible than the managers standing behind them. As an example, Professors Weiss
and Wruck studied Eastern Airlines bankruptcy and concluded that lack of credible
information was one of the reasons creditors were not able to identify the downward
spiral of Eastern Airlines during its Chapter 11. The result was a loss of two billion
dollars or almost 50% of Eastern's prebankruptcy value.
Brian L. Betker, et al., "Warm with Sunny Skies": Disclosure Statement Forecasts, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 809, 810-11 (1999).
121. See, e.g., Picker, supra note 94, at 523 (discussing unsecured creditors' access to informa-
tion regarding the debtor's secured indebtedness).
122. Frost, supra note 43, at 109.
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tion process may allow insiders to engage in post-confirmation self-
dealing, which, because of jurisdictional concerns, is beyond the au-
thority of the bankruptcy courts to redress.124
Other checks on the debtor in possession's control - the participa-
tion of unsecured creditors committees, appointment of trustees or ex-
aminers, or conversion or dismissal of the Chapter 11 case - may also
prove ineffective. Creditors' committees, for example, are a good the-
oretical idea, but practical problems stand in the way of their effec-
tiveness. First, such committees are not formed in all cases.125 If
formed, the individual committee members likely will not possess the
financial and legal skills necessary to navigate the committee through
the case, 126 but if there are no unencumbered assets, no funds will be
available to pay for needed professionals. 2 7 Moreover, the commit-
tee itself may not adequately represent the interests of all creditors.
For example, a committee composed of banks with general unsecured
claims has no incentive to advance the interests of, say, consumers
with priority claims. 28 To do so would only diminish the members'
ultimate recovery, as would appointment of a separate committee for
the consumer claims because of the increased cost. 29
Of equally limited value in reigning in the power of the debtor in
possession are Code provisions allowing for the appointment of a trus-
tee or examiner and dismissal or conversion of the case. The limita-
tions on the creditors' committee discussed above diminish the value
of these provisions; an unformed, inactive, or unfunded committee is
not likely to file motions for such relief, especially since they are not
likely to be granted. 130
To its credit, Congress has seen the need to limit debtor control in
one respect: bankruptcy reform provides a change in the "exclusivity
period," which currently precludes any party other than the debtor
from filing a plan of reorganization for a specified period of time.
123. Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Reorganization Cases, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 385, 390 n.16 (1998); Unproposed Solution, supra note 94, at 138; Michael
Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapterll, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1046
(1992).
124. Frost, supra note 43, at 126.
125. Id. at 120.
126. Systems Failure, supra note 113, at 252; Cuevas, supra note 123, at 395.
127. The debtor can ensure that no funds are available to the committee through the effective
use of security. See supra, Part II.A. The same result can be obtained through postpetition
financing.
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (2003).
129. See, e.g., Systems Failure, supra note 113, at 251-252.
130. Cuevas, supra note 123, at 400.
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Under current law, exclusivity lasts 120 days, but is routinely extended
under the lenient "for cause" standard.' 3'
Otherwise, however, Congress has left the Code largely intact as it
concerns debtor control in large business bankruptcies, despite the
clear indications that the Code's attempt to strike a balance between
the Chapter 11 debtor and its creditor body have failed. Moreover,
Congress has likewise failed to address bankruptcy jurisprudence that,
toward the goal of fostering rehabilitation, actually conflicts with the
Code itself.
Nowhere is this point more clear than with the "doctrine of neces-
sity." The doctrine of necessity, also called the "critical vendor doc-
trine," involves the debtor's request to pay the prepetition claims of
specific vendors, suppliers, or other creditors whose goods or services
are essential to the debtor's operations. Satisfaction of these critical
vendor claims can take many forms, 132 but the justification for them is
largely the same - if the prepetition claim is not satisfied, the vendor
will not deal with the debtor postpetition, and the debtor will have no
viable shot at reorganizing.
The "doctrine of necessity" dates back many years in bankruptcy
practice, growing out of the separate but related doctrines of the "six
months rule" and the "necessity of payment rule." The first of these
stems from railroad reorganizations in the 19th century in which the
appointed receiver was allowed to pay certain prepetition debts for
labor, supplies, and equipment. Equitable in nature, the rule "only
applied to expenses necessary for the continued operation of the rail-
road that arose immediately preceding the petition."' 133 This rule is
now codified at § 1171(b) of the Code, but remains applicable only to
railroads.
The necessity of payment rule "developed to allow trustees to pay
pre-petition debts under threats of creditors in order to obtain contin-
ued supplies or services essential to the continued operation of the
debtor's business."' 34 Also originally applied in railroad reorganiza-
tion cases, the rule was extended, quite logically, to airline cases, and
grew into the current doctrine of necessity. 35 Under the modern for-
mulation, the type of business involved is no longer terribly relevant;
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2003).
132. See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reor-
ganization, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75 (1991); Brian Leepson, A Case for the Use of a Broad Court
Equity Power to Facilitate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 775 (1996).





rather, the cases emphasize the "paramount consideration of Chapter
11, that of continued operation and rehabilitation of the debtor."'1 36
However, this "paramount consideration" fails to take the Code it-
self into account. As noted above, only in railroad cases are these
sorts of payments explicitly permitted. It is a well-settled rule of statu-
tory interpretation that where the legislation specifically addresses an
issue, its silence elsewhere demonstrates intent to limit application of
the rule. Moreover, the Code prescribes in no uncertain terms the
order in which creditors are to be paid. After satisfaction of valid
liens, the Code requires that § 507(a) priority claims be satisfied
before general unsecured creditors may receive anything. To pay the
prepetition claim of a so-called critical vendor, whose claim is nearly
always a general unsecured claim, is to accord to that creditor a pre-
ferred status that the language of the Code simply does not permit.
Courts have relied on a variety of Code provisions to justify devia-
tion from the mandated payment scheme. 137 Some courts, remarka-
bly, do not even address the effect of their decisions on § 507(a); 138
those that do tend to downplay the importance of § 507(a) when com-
pared with the need to foster rehabilitation. As one court stated:
A rigid application of the priorities of § 507 would be inconsistent
with the fundamental purpose of reorganization and of the Act's
grant of equity powers to bankruptcy courts, which is to create a
flexible mechanism that will permit the greatest likelihood of sur-
vival of the debtor and payment of creditors in full or at least
proportionately. 139
Too often overlooked, however, are the types of creditors holding
§ 507(a) priority claims, including workers and consumers. Indeed, if
the claim for a necessity payment is not for the benefit of an on-going
business concern, it will likely be denied despite evidence of actual
benefit to the estate, which, in turn, would foster rehabilitation. This
was the case in Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Ma-
136. Id.
137. According to the CoServ court, critical vendor payments have been authorized under
§ 363(b)(1), which authorizes use of estate property outside the ordinary course of the debtor's
business, the debtor in possession's general powers under § 1107(a), "and even the Court's
power under 11 U.S.C. § 549 to reverse a post petition transfer." Id. at 392-93. Other courts
have determined that the general equitable powers under § 105(a) permit critical vendor pay-
ments. See In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 826 (D. Del. 1999) (citing In re Fin. News
Network Inc., 134 B.R. 732, 736 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1991), In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that "proponent of the payment must show substantial neces-
sity"), In re Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (stating that
payment must be "necessary to avert a serious threat to the chapter 11 process")).
138. In re Just for Feet Inc., 242 B.R. 821.
139. In re Chateaugay Corp., 80 B.R. 279, 287 (S.D. N.Y. 1987).
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bey,140 where, despite clear evidence that an emergency fund to pro-
vide medical services to tort claimants would actually diminish the
total amount of claims against the estate, the Fourth Circuit held the
lower court was without authority to allow payment outside of a con-
firmed plan.' 41
Tort claimants have found themselves on the losing end of interpre-
tive decisions in other areas as well, again in ways that run contrary to
the Code. The Code expressly provides a codebtor stay in Chapter
12142 and Chapter 13143 cases, but not in Chapter 11. Yet, many courts
have extended the automatic stay in Chapter 11 to protect the corpo-
rate debtor's officers, directors, and insurers, even where those par-
ties' conduct give rise to causes of action independent of those
asserted against the debtor. 44
However, extending the automatic stay to nondebtors is only a tem-
porary solution, but the protection is often made permanent through
the use of third party releases in plans of reorganization. The Code
does not authorize third party releases, which forever bar actions
against parties not in bankruptcy who may also be liable to the
debtor's creditors, 145 but neither are they expressly forbidden. The
problem lies in the language of § 524(e), which provides that the "dis-
140. 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987).
141. Id. See generally Jason A. Rosenthal, Note, Courts of Inequity: The Bankruptcy Laws'
Failure to Adequately Protect Dalkon Shield Victims, 45 FLA. L. REV. 223 (1993) (providing a full
discussion). The Fourth Circuit was not nearly as rigid in its interpretation of the Code's lan-
guage, however, when tort claimants sought direct suits against the debtor's officers, directors,
and insurer. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986); In re A.H. Robins
Co., 828 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1987).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 1201 (2003).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (2003).
144. A. H. Robbins, Co., 788 F.2d at 999; Lomas Fin. Corp. v. N. Trust (In re Lomas), 117 B.R.
64, 68 (S.D. N.Y. 1990) See generally Elizabeth H. Winchester, Note, Expanding the Bankruptcy
Code: The Use of Section 362 and Section 105 to Protect Solvent Executives of Debtor Corpora-
tions, 58BRooK. L. REV. 929 (1992).
145. There are three general premises on which justifications for third party releases rest:
(1) a claim against a non-debtor is tantamount to a claim against the debtor where the
non-debtor will have a claim of indemnification or contribution against the debtor ei-
ther through the operation of surety law, the debtor-company's charter, state corpora-
tion laws, or by way of agreement between the debtor and the non-debtor; (2) a non-
debtor contributing to the reorganization will not contribute funds if claims against the
non-debtor are not enjoined, thereby adversely affecting the reorganization; and (3)
suits against a third party who has a role in restructuring the debtor, but who has in-
curred personal liability to a creditor, may adversely affect the reorganization because
the third party's attention may be distracted from the reorganization efforts or the third
party will have no incentive to continue its efforts if claims against it or others are not
enjoined.
Peter M. Boyle, Note, Non-Debtor Liability in Chapter I1: Validity of Third-Party Discharge in
Bankruptcy, 61 FOROHIAM L. REV. 421, 430-31 (1992).
2003] BANKRUPTCY REFORM 393
charge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt. ' 146 Some
courts hold that this language is an outright prohibition on third party
releases, 47 while other courts take a more flexible approach, stating
that § 524(e) merely describes the effect of the discharge without
prohibiting the courts from broadening its reach.1 48
To be sure, third party releases may serve as a valuable aspect of a
plan of reorganization, such as when a creditor agrees to temporarily
forego its right to pursue payment from a nondebtor guarantor, so
long as plan payments are made and the debt will be paid in full. In
other cases, however, such third party releases simply cannot be
squared with public policy because the released parties are not only
relieved from the consequences of the wrongs they have committed
against the public, but they also retain the fortunes amassed as a result
of their wrongdoing.1 49 Such cases as these are not only relying on
146. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2003).
147. For a thorough discussion of the allowance of third party releases among the circuits, see
Barbara J. Houser & Douglas Wade Carvell, A New Twist on Third Party Plan Protections
(2001) (on file with authors).
Subsequent to the Houser & Carvell piece, the Sixth Circuit expressly approved of third party
releases even as to nonconsenting creditors in Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp.
(In reDow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002) cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 85 (2002).
148. Id. See Peter E. Meltzer, Getting Out of Jail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Plan Process Be
Used to Release Nondebtor Parties?, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1997) (providing a detailed interpre-
tive analysis of the language of § 524(e)). Statutory interpretation alone, however, may not pro-
vide an appropriate answer to whether third party releases are permissible as part of a
bankruptcy plan. One commentator describes the debate over § 524(e) as a "red herring," argu-
ing instead that:
A proper understanding of the reach of bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction and accompany-
ing injunctive powers leads to the conclusion that nondebtor releases are not an appro-
priate extension of the historical injunctive powers of federal bankruptcy courts. In the
absence of express congressional authorization, the courts have no jurisdictional au-
thority to approve nondebtor releases.
Ralph Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revisiting Jurisdictional
Precepts and the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8(1998).
149. No better example of the use of third party releases for the benefit of nondebtor wrong-
doers exists than the bankruptcy of the A.H. Robins Company, which produced the infamous
Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine birth control device. An excellent and comprehensive descrip-
tion of the Robins bankruptcy is found in RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY
OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY. The Robins case is shocking in virtually all respects. As
Sobol recounts,
[In prebankruptcy tort litigation] Robins was opposed by highly skilled litigators who,
over the company's determined and, it has been suggested, improper resistance, suc-
ceeded in proving that Robins had marketed the Dalkon Shield without investigating
its safety and that, after they learned of the propensity of the device to cause life-
threatening pelvic infections, company officials had withheld and even destroyed this
information while the Dalkon Shield was still being sold and used.
SOBOL, supra note 40 at x. Through the third party release provision of the Robins plan, these
same company officials were completely relieved of any personal liability for their wrongful
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questionable statutory and jurisdictional authority, they also set a
troubling precedent. It is difficult indeed to justify the rehabilitation
of a business where tortious or fraudulent conduct has created the
company's financial woes, and allowing wrongdoers to evade their re-
sponsibility to their victims diminishes the incentive for businesses
generally to ensure they deal fairly and honestly with their customers
and the public.
The combination of Chapter 11's business-friendly statutes and ju-
risprudence 51 raises a critical question similar to that posed with re-
spect to security's supremacy: In the face of extensive scholarly
criticism and calls for change, how is it that Chapter 11 has remained
largely unchanged throughout the bankruptcy reform efforts in
Congress?
One possibility is that America's captains of industry, including the
banking sector, like the system as it is currently constructed - why
wouldn't this be the case? Executive compensation is generous, de-
spite the troubled financial condition of the company.15' Decision-
making continues in much the same manner as before the filing, but
with the added benefit that the automatic stay will hold creditors at
conduct. They also profited handsomely when the plan was confirmed: The acquisition of Rob-
ins by American Home Products "resulted in the issuance of $916 million of American Home
Products stock. Of this amount, $385 million went to the Robins family ... As an exchange of
stock, the transaction was tax-free." Id. at 286. A similar result occurred in the bankruptcy of
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. The confirmed plan in that case released about 200 indi-
viduals from substantial securities fraud liability and allowed those same individuals to retain the
vast fortunes amassed as a result of the fraud. Brubaker, supra note 148 at 4 n. I and accompa-
nying text. Fortunately, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, releases relating to securities fraud may
no longer be approvable. According to the Sixth Circuit, third party releases are permissible
only if they are not otherwise inconsistent with the Code. See Dow Corning, supra n. 147 at 656.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes certain debts related to securities law violations nondischarge-
able in bankruptcy. Thus, releasing an individual who would be subject to this new nondis-
chargeability provision creates the sort of inconsistency the Sixth Circuit describes as
impermissible. More recently, but as yet unresolved, evidence has emerged that the W.R. Grace
Company, a producer of asbestos and asbestos-related products that is now in bankruptcy,
falsely marketed a product called Monokote as being free of asbestos, which W.R. Grace knew
was not true. Michael Moss & Adrianne Appel, Protecting the Product: A Special Report.; Com-
pany's Silence Countered Safety Fears About Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 2001, at Al. Accord-
ing to the Times report, W.R. Grace pursued a "strategy of silence," choosing to avoid disclosure
of Monokote's asbestos content in order to keep the product on the market. Id.
150. Other than the doctrine of necessity and third party releases, which we have discussed
herein, there are certainly other issues in which the courts have tilted the balance in favor of the
debtor. See, e.g., J. Ronald Trost et al., Survey of the New Value Exception to the Absolute Prior-
ity Rule and the Preliminary Problem of Classification, SD24 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTIINUING LEGAL
Eouc. 401 (1998).
151. Matt Miller, When Failure Pays, DAILY DEAL (N.Y.), Feb. 27, 2003 ("Since the late
1990s, bankrupt companies have routinely offered their top officers rich pay packages to stay on,
even though many of these executives helped shepherd their companies into Chapter 11 in the
first place.").
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bay indefinitely, especially pesky tort claimants (or their estate repre-
sentatives) who claim the company has caused them harm. On the
whole, Chapter 11 is roughly akin to those "country club prisons" (or
"Club Feds") like that in which the fictional Murphy Brown once
spent time for refusing to reveal a news source 152 - no one really
wants to end up there, but the perquisites make the stay alarmingly
tolerable.
Although there is no direct evidence on this point, Congressional
history, coupled with a deafening silence from the corporate and fi-
nance worlds, lends some plausible support to this conclusion.
First, consider the banking industry, which is, after all, the reason
Congress decided an overhaul of the Code was necessary in the first
place. Despite its call for sweeping changes in the Code's treatment of
consumer cases, from all appearances the banking industry seems to
have no interest in changing Chapter 11. The reason for the industry's
silence is a matter of conjecture. Perhaps they are true believers that
the rehabilitation policy is their best chance of getting paid. Banks, of
course, are the creditors who may look to the debtors' assets for satis-
faction of debt through security agreements, but they may neverthe-
less have unsecured claims as well. Even so, the current regime offers
an opportunity to transform an unsecured claim into one secured by
the debtor's assets through post-petition financing that is cross collat-
eralized,153 offering another plausible reason for the lack of vocal op-
position to the current Chapter 11 process. Indeed, providing debtor
in possession financing can be a lucrative endeavor. 54 On a more
cynical note, the current regime may help those banks that were in-
volved in the pre-petition mismanagement or misdeeds of their debt-
152. "Murphy Brown" was, of course, the popular television series in which Candace Bergen
portrayed the hard-nosed and liberal-leaning reporter for a local news program. Murphy, relish-
ing somewhat in the prospect of doing time for refusing to reveal a news source, was horrified by
the comforts of her incarceration, including planned recreational activities and surroundings that
resembled a retreat more than a jail. Just how comfortable or pleasant minimum-security incar-
ceration is in reality is both beyond the scope of this Article and beside the point because their
portrayal in popular lore is sufficient to make our point. However, we do note that when there is
public outcry over prison amenities, it is typically directed at facilities with heightened security
and housing street criminals rather than those who committed white-collar crimes.
153. See generally Tabb, supra note 132.
154. See Jenny Wiggins, Lenders See Profit in Bankruptcy, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002.
2003]
396 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
ors avoid exposure. This was certainly the case with Enron, 55 but few
cases receive that sort of scrutiny or attention. 56
As with the banking industry, the corporate world generally has
also been silent on bankruptcy reform, insofar as Chapter 11 is con-
cerned. There are isolated exceptions within specific industries, such
as when a spokesperson within the telecommunications industry com-
plained that the number of companies in bankruptcy was hurting
those who tried to make good on their debts and remain out of bank-
ruptcy courts. 157
On a broader level, however, to fundamentally alter the character
of Chapter 11 would be a 180-degree shift in the policy that Congress
and the judiciary have exhibited toward business over the past 20
years or so. It is not difficult to imagine the outcry that would follow
any Congressional attempt to wrest control from a corporate debtor's
management in Chapter 11, despite evidence that such a move may be
warranted or that it could prove beneficial to the varied interests in a
corporate bankruptcy case. As we noted earlier, proposals to change
the way stock options are treated in corporate records and to sever
the conflicted roles of accountants serving as both auditors and con-
sultants met with heated industry opposition and insurmountable re-
sistance in Congress. 58
The corporate fraud and accounting problems are just isolated ex-
amples of the myriad ways in which national policy, both legislatively
and judicially, has skewed the balance of power in favor of the largest
of business interests and against those who ultimately depend on
them. Legislation enacted under the guise of deregulating business
and fostering competition has instead permitted extraordinary con-
155. See e.g., Carol J. Loomis, "Whatever It Takes," Fortune, November 25, 2002; "Banks
Taught Enron Tricks of Trade: Congressional Investigators Say Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Set Up
Sham Transactions for Energy Trader," CNN-Money, July 23, 2002, available at http://
money.cnn.com/2002/07/23/news/companies/citigroup; Julie Creswell, "Debt Tricks: Covering
Their Assets," Fortune, February 21, 2002.
156. Little attention was paid to Polaroid's bankruptcy, for example, despite allegations that
the company intentionally misstated its financial health and, in concert with its secured creditors,
controlled the auction process in a way that effectively locked unsecured creditors out. A ven-
ture capital arm of Bank One bought the company's assets at what some believe was an artifi-
cially low price. The case resulted in significant job loss, and the company discontinued both
severance payments for some terminated employees as well as retiree health benefits. Kris
Frieswick, What's Wrong with This Picture: Polaroid's Passage Through Chapter 11 Exposes
How Bankruptcy Can Give Debtors Too Much Power, CFO MAG., Jan. 1, 2003. An examiner
has been appointed to investigate the matter. Jeffrey Krasner, Examiner to Probe Polaroid,
BOSTON GLoBE, Jan. 17, 2003, at D3.
157. See, e.g., Simon London, Critics Are Hoping It Could Be End of Story for Chapter /I:
Disquiet is Growing Over the US Bankruptcy Code, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at 22.
158. See supra note 19.
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centrations of power in industries that are vital to the American peo-
ple, the media included. 159 At the same time, Congress and the courts
will save corporations and their owners and managers from the conse-
quences of their own misdeeds by making litigation regarding securi-
ties fraud, products liability, civil rights violations, and other matters
of public importance difficult, 160 if not impossible. 16'
159. See generally ALGER, supra note 12.
160. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or
Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 987 (1998) (discussing effect of statutes such as the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, as well as court rules, in restricting access to the federal courts in AREAS, while
leaving business access to courts largely intact, if not enhanced); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bomb-
ing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1619-21 (2002) (discussing pro-defendant orientation of United States Su-
preme Court and acceleration of "'antiliability orientation" through the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act, which imposes strict pleading requirements of plaintiffs and permits stay of
discovery during pendency of motion to dismiss); William S. Lerach, "The Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995-27 Months Later": Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act's Brave New World, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 597, 607 (1998)
(noting that in the early years of the PSLRA "only a handful of Reform Act cases have survived
the motion to dismiss stage"); Jeff Gerth & Joseph Kahn, Critics Say U.S. Energy Agency is Weak
in Oversight of Utilities, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at Al (discussing California energy crisis
and limited involvement of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission led by Curt Hebert Jr., "a
fierce advocate of unfettered markets"); Lowell Bergman & Jeff Gerth, Power Trader Tied to
Bush Finds Washington All Ears, N. Y. TIMES , May 25, 2001, at Al (discussing Enron's influ-
ence over national energy policy); Secrets, THE AM. PROSPEc-r, Dec. 30, 2002, at 6 (discussing
provision of Homeland Security bill that shields drug manufacturer Eli Lilly from liability result-
ing from vaccine linked to autism in children); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a
Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229 (1999) (discussing
political forces driving amendments to discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
Professor Thornburg's observations are particularly apt:
It is not surprising that organized forces have united to argue in favor of cutbacks in
discovery. By limiting discovery, they do not merely strive to decrease disliked litiga-
tion costs. More importantly, their efforts to limit discovery are intimately tied to ef-
forts to circumscribe enforcement of disliked substantive law. "Court reform" becomes
part of the package with "tort reform." This group consists in large part of repeat
corporate defendants and their insurers. Casting their pleas as arguments for "effi-
ciency," and even defenses of American productivity, these organizations have lobbied
the Advisory Committee for further restrictions on discovery. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, they have threatened to go to Congress for relief, circumventing the usual rules
amendment process and further politicizing the entire world of federal civil procedure.
Id. at 230-31.
161. For the poor who rely on state or federally funded legal representation, access to the
courts is effectively denied in a variety of contexts. The Brennan Center for Justice did a seven-
part report on the politics and reality of legal aid, with particular emphasis on the budget cuts
and prohibitions on representation in specific legal matters in the mid 1990s. Some activities
which were banned in 1996 included initiation of or participation in class action suits, representa-
tion of aliens and incarcerated persons, certain evictions from public housing if the client was,
among other things, charged with the illegal sale or distribution of drugs, abortion litigation,
welfare reform, redistricting, political advocacy, and lobbying. Brennan Center For Justice, Re-
stricting Legal Services: How Congress Left the Poor with Only Half a Lawyer (2000), available
at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/Article2.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2003).
Former Representative George Gekas, a principle sponsor of bankruptcy reform, wanted even
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Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that Chapter 11 func-
tions as it currently does. A Congress that has consistently focused on
reducing or eliminating governmental interference with big business
generally is hardly likely to do so in the specific context of Chapter 11.
Even if it did, such an effort would no doubt be strenuously opposed.
If these assumptions are correct, then Chapter 11, and bankruptcy re-
form generally, may be exposed for what it truly is - a representation
of what the powerful, moneyed interests believe is in their own best
interests. Given the ease with which businesses may, first, transfer
their wealth to one or a few preferred lenders (most of whom have
significant political clout) and, second, control the outcome of any
bankruptcy through both express Code provisions and rehabilitation
jurisprudence, bankruptcy may be part of a general business strategy
rather than a last resort for the financially troubled. However, where
there are no political contributions there is no debate, no nostalgic
yearning for the days when businesses viewed bankruptcy as a moral
failure as much as a financial one, no contrived 'bankruptcy tax' quan-
tifying the costs of corporate failure on society as a whole, especially
when that corporation is solvent and able to repay its debts. Instead,
such laments are confined to the consumer bankruptcy context,
pushed singularly and solely by the financial services industry and its
campaign dollars.
more restrictions. Although unsuccessful, Gekas would have brought within the prohibition
"housing and employment discrimination, consumer fraud and defective products, utility shut-
offs, patients' rights, adoptions, welfare benefits, and constitutional challenges to any statute."
Brennan Center For Justice, Hidden Agendas: What is Really Behind Attacks on Legal Aid Law-
yers?" (2001), at 7, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programsldownloads/article7.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2003). In response to the restrictions, a former legal aid attorney stated:
These restrictions ... decrease the accountability of executive and legislative actions.
Instead of stripping the courts' power to hear cases involving the rights of poor people,
Congress simply stripped advocates for the poor of the power to bring cases. You don't
have to regard the restrictions on legal services lawyers as a form of political repression
in order to recognize it as another way of immunizing elected officials and bureaucrats
from constitutional limitations on their behavior.
Brennan Center For Justice, Left Out in the Cold: How Clients are Affected by Restrictions on
Their Legal Services Lawyers (2000), at 7, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/
downloads/article6.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2003).
At the state level, too, the poor can be denied legal redress. Consider the case of the Tulane
Law Clinic, which represented the poor, and largely minority, community of Convent, Louisiana.
A large plastics manufacturer, Shintech, sought to build a new plant in Convent, but citizens
were opposed because of dangers to the public health, and the Clinic represented the commu-
nity. Business interests lobbied hard and won a change to rules governing the Clinic so as to
effectively preclude continued representation of Convent's citizens and similar future actions.
See Kim Erickson, Backlash on the Bayou; Tulane University's Environmental Law Clinic Suc-
cessfully Opposes Shintech PVC Plant in Convent, Louisiana, EARTH ACTION NETWORK, INC.,
Nov. 1, 1999, at 22.
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"Now watch what you say or they'll be calling you a radical, liberal,
fanatical, criminal. "162
While the banks may lay an ever-widening claim to assets through
security interests, and inept, sometimes corrupt, corporate managers
may continue to operate their bankrupt companies, Congress has cho-
sen to focus on the ordinary consumer debtor as the root of all evil
under the Code. 163 Representative Moran fairly well summarizes why
proponents of bankruptcy reform believe such action is necessary:
The time-honored principle of moral responsibility and personal ob-
ligation to pay one's debts has been eroded by the convenience and
ease with which one can discharge his or her obligations. What was
once the option of last resort has too often become the preferred
option of choice. A legislative fix is vital to distinguish between
those who truly need a "fresh start" and those capable of assuming
greater responsibility and making good on at least some of what
they owe. 16 4
On the other hand, Congressional supporters of bankruptcy reform
did not rely on mere rhetoric; they said they had facts to support their
claims. When bankruptcy reform was first introduced, the economy
was robust, unemployment was low, and disposable personal income
162. Supertramp, The Logical Song on BREAKFAST IN AMERICA (Almo Music Corp. & Deli-
cate Music 1979).
163. Bankruptcy reform also creates a "fast track" Chapter 11 mechanism for small businesses
in the belief that too many of these debtors languish in bankruptcy without real hope of reorga-
nizing. Just as with consumer bankruptcies, there are faulty assumptions underlying the efficacy
of these small business provisions, but they are beyond the scope of this article. In any event, a
review of the small business provisions does not leave the reader with the sense that Congress
believes most small businesses to be immoral, irresponsible and abusive of bankruptcy, as do the
consumer provisions.
164. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998: Prepared Statement of James P. Moran Before the House
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 105th Cong. (1998).
Acting as a model citizen, Representative Moran upheld his "moral responsibility" and "per-
sonal obligation to pay his debts" without utilizing the "convenience and ease" that have eroded
the system. One month before signing onto the bill as the lead Democratic supporter, Represen-
tative Moran simply obtained a $447,500 loan to alleviate his financial problems. Like ninety
percent of bankruptcies which are caused by medical bills, loss of employment, or divorce, Rep-
resentative Moran's financial problems were a product of high credit card debts, stock market
losses and paying for the cancer treatment of his daughter. Fortunately for Representative Mo-
ran, MBNA Corp., the world's largest independent credit-card agency and a major supporter of
the Bankruptcy Reform Bill, generously gave him this loan at a significantly below industry
standard interest rate. Molly Ivins, Bankrolling Political Credit, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 2002, at 25,
2002 WL 100518954. The House Ethics Committee also felt that Representative Moran upheld
his "moral responsibility." The Committee declined to open a formal investigation on the matter
and found that there was no connection between the loan Representative Moran received and
his support of the Bankruptcy Reform Bill. Spencer S. Hsu, Moran Says Ethics Panel Won't
Probe 1998 Loan, THE WASH. PosTr, Feb. 6, 2003, at B07, 2003 WL 10895903.
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was on the rise, but at the same time there was a significant rise in
consumer bankruptcy filings. 165 The Congressional conclusion that
something was amiss was further bolstered by a study at the time that
found roughly 15 percent of all consumer filings were "abusive" be-
cause debtors, despite being able to repay some of their debt through
Chapter 13 plans, instead chose to rather cavalierly discharge them in
Chapter 7.166 As a result of the abuse, banks were losing around $40
billion a year. 167 The study also concluded that the American public
bore the banks' loss in the form of an annual bankruptcy tax of
around $400 for every American family. 168
The Congressional response was an effort to restrict access to Chap-
ter 7 for consumer debtors, essentially requiring all such debtors to
prove their honesty and misfortune as a condition precedent to bank-
ruptcy relief.169 Although bankruptcy reform works myriad changes
in consumer bankruptcy law, its most salient feature is its "means
test," which closes the courtroom doors to any consumer debtor who
cannot demonstrate a dire financial need for Chapter 7 relief.
The philosophical underpinnings of bankruptcy reform and the
means test could be justified if there were something other than the
financial support of the banking industry backing them up. In reality,
however, the means test is an overreaching and fundamentally flawed
method for weeding out those debtors who truly do abuse the good
graces of the Code. More generally, lamentations over the problems
with consumer bankruptcy are exceedingly difficult to justify and, in
light of the scandalous conduct in America's corporations, accounting
firms, and financial institutions over the last few years, combined with
an undisputed downturn in the economy, continued Congressional fo-
cus on consumer bankruptcies is downright baffling.
A. The Means Test in a Nutshell
Bankruptcy reform's "means test" implements an elaborate mea-
surement of income and expenses to determine whether there are suf-
ficient funds available to the debtor on a monthly basis to warrant
prohibiting that debtor from receiving Chapter 7 relief and instead
requiring a Chapter 13 payment plan or precluding bankruptcy relief
altogether. Such debtors are deemed "abusers" of Chapter 7, a term
165. 144CONG. REc.. E 87 (Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
166. Id.
167. Id.




that normally connotes some actual impropriety, 70 based on nothing
more than an inability to meet the rigid and unworkable calculations
imposed under the means test.
Bankruptcy reform's means test broadly defines "income" as the
monthly average of virtually every last penny that has come into the
debtor's hands within the six months prior to the filing of the peti-
tion.' 71 The few exceptions, payments to "victims of war crimes or
crimes against humanity" and those related to international terrorism,
for example, are unlikely to arise in the vast majority of cases. Nota-
bly, the definition of income provides no exclusion for amounts the
debtor acquired by sheer happenstance, such as a lucky lottery ticket
for a few hundred dollars, or amounts contributed by others, such as
family members, over which the debtor has no control. This latter
example is expressly included in the bankruptcy reform bill, even
though the contributor can discontinue the funds at any time for any
reason. The result in many cases will be an artificially inflated mea-
sure of the debtor's monthly income. 172
In contrast, bankruptcy reform's determination of the debtor's
monthly expenses produces an artificially deflated figure. Under the
bill, most expenses have nothing to do with what the debtor actually
pays; rather, bankruptcy reform allows only the amounts for food,
clothing, and other day-to-day needs specified under guidelines that
the Internal Revenue Service uses when it is negotiating workout
agreements with taxpayers. 173 There are a handful of additional al-
170. "Abuse" is defined as a corrupt practice or custom or improper use or treatment. To
abuse is to deceive or to put to a wrong or improper use. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICrIONARY
3 (college ed. 1959).
171. More specifically, bankruptcy reform defines "income" as:
[T]he average monthly income from all sources which the debtor receives (or, in a joint
case, the debtor and the debtor's spouse receive) without regard to whether the income
is taxable income, derived during the 6-month period preceding the date of determina-
tion, which shall be the date which is the last day of the calendar month immediately
preceding the date of the bankruptcy filing. If the debtor is providing the debtor's cur-
rent monthly income at the time of the filing and otherwise the date of determination
shall be such date on which the debtor's current monthly income is determined by the
court for the purposes of this Act; and [the definition] includes any amount paid by any
entity other than the debtor (or, in a joint case, the debtor and the debtor's spouse), on
a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents
(and, in a joint case, the debtor's spouse if not otherwise a dependent), but excludes
benefits received under the Social Security Act and payments to victims of war crimes
or crimes against humanity on account of their status as victims of such crimes.
H.R. REP. No. 107-617 (2002), http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/bam/bkreform2003/bkreform.
html.
172. See infra note 182.
173. Internal Revenue Service, Collection Financial Standards, available at http://www.irs.gov/
individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html. It is interesting to note that the IRS itself refers to these
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lowable expenses, but these, too, are tied to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice's guidelines or will require the debtor to incur litigation costs to
determine whether such additional expenses are reasonable and nec-
essary.174  Any general deviation from the means test's expense stan-
dards is similarly formidable for the debtor because of the burden,
documentary requirements, 75  and the necessity of counsel's
assistance.' 76
Bankruptcy reform also specifies how secured and priority debts
will be expensed to determine the debtor's disposable monthly in-
come. Generally speaking, for each type of debt the monthly payment
amount is the total due divided by 60, although the total for secured
debt is limited to that actually due over five years.
Once these amounts have been calculated, a debtor is deemed to
have abused the provisions of Chapter 7, and the case must be dis-
missed or converted to Chapter 13, if "the debtor's current monthly
figures as "guidelines" while bankruptcy reform imposes them as an inflexible, and quite likely
inaccurate, hard and fast rule.
174. Under the Bill, additional expenses may be allowed, in reasonable circumstances for the
following reasons: to maintain the safety of the debtor and his family from family violence; for
food and clothing, of up to 5 percent of the food and clothing categories as specified by the
National Standards issued by the Internal Revenue Service; for the continuation of actual ex-
penses paid by the debtor for care and support of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled house-
hold member or member of the debtor's immediate family, who is not a dependent and who is
unable to pay for such expenses; for a debtor eligible for chapter 13, the actual administrative
expenses of administering a chapter 13 plan for the district in which the debtor resides, up to an
amount of 10 percent of the projected plan payments, as determined under schedules issued by
the Executive Office for United States Trustees; for actual expenses for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to $1,500 per year per child to attend a private or public elementary
or secondary school; for housing and utilities, in excess of the allowance specified by the Local
Standards for housing and utilities issued by the International Revenue Service, based on the
actual expenses for home energy costs, if the debtor provides documentation of such expenses.
H.R. REt. No. 107-617.
175. The Bill states:
(B)(i) In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the presumption of abuse
may only be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances that justify addi-
tional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no
reasonable alternative.
(ii) In order to establish special circumstances, the debtor shall be required to
itemize each additional expense or adjustment of income and to provide -
(I) documentation for such expense or adjustment to income; and
(II) a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make such ex-
penses or adjustment to income necessary and reasonable.
(iii) The debtor shall attest under oath to the accuracy of any information provided
to demonstrate that additional expenses or adjustments to income are
required.
H.R. REPi. No. 107-617.
176. The availability of counsel is also severely undermined by bankruptcy reform, which not
only provides for sanctions against debtors' counsel under the means test, but also seeks to
actually regulate the manner in which debtors' attorney represent their clients.
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income . . . when multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of 25
percent of the debtor's non-priority unsecured claims, or $6,000,
whichever is greater, or $10,000."177
As so constructed, the means test is inherently flawed, producing
faulty results and misguided incentives. As we discussed above, bank-
ruptcy reform creates the potential for both artificially inflated income
and deflated expenses. However, one must also consider the calcula-
tion of priority debts. Because these debts - which include alimony
and child support - are taken into account before arriving at the de-
terminative disposable monthly income, debtors who are more seri-
ously delinquent in their support obligations are less likely to be
tagged as "abusers," because they are more likely to qualify for Chap-
ter 7 under the means test. Moreover, the calculation of priority debts
actually gives debtors an incentive to forego making alimony or child
support payments, whether in collusion with the recipient or without
regard to the consequences on the recipient of nonpayment.
The calculation of payments on secured indebtedness is equally
flawed, but for a different reason. First, it draws an arbitrary distinc-
tion between owners versus lessees of property. For example, trans-
portation expenses are included in the Internal Revenue Service
guidelines - for the owner of a car, there is a double deduction, one
under the guidelines and another for payment of secured debt. Bank-
ruptcy reform provides no such allowance for the lessee's actual lease
payments. The same anomaly exists for homeowners versus their
counterparts who rent their homes.
In addition, the means test's use of a five-year repayment forecast
across the board to determine the debtor's average monthly payments
produces anomalous results. 178 For example, consider three similarly
situated debtors, each of which has a $300 per month car payment.
One debtor has five years left to pay his loan, the second debtor has
three years, and the third debtor has one year. The means test distorts
how much the second and third debtor will contribute to secured debt.
In reality only the first debtor's payments are actually reflected in the
means test; he must pay $300 per month for a period of five years.
The second debtor will show a $180 monthly obligation ($10,800 total
due divided by 60), and the third debtor's means tested car payment is
a paltry $60 ($3,600 total due divided by 60). Thus, the means test
assumes that the second and third debtors have far greater monthly
disposable income than they actually do have, and assuming the exis-
177. H.R. REP. No. 107-617..
178. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-617. H.R. 333.
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tence of funds these debtors never have the opportunity to enjoy may
thrust the 'abusive filer' tag on them.
Yet another example of the means test's problematic nature is its
failure to account for demographic distinctions among classes of debt-
ors, the elderly for example. The means test does not account for the
fact that the elderly demonstrate many important differences from the
population as a whole. They are more prone to increased future ex-
penditures and reduced future incomes. 179 These variables will ulti-
mately affect the success of their repayment plans.180 Furthermore,
the premises of the bankruptcy reform policy carried out through the
means test are undermined when applied to the elderly. For example,
the promise of a fresh start through Chapter 13 is virtually useless to
an older debtor;t 81 the majority of our elderly population is not com-
posed of able-bodied debtors, who are capable of earning an income
that would allow them to live comfortably and still make payments to
their creditors. 182
Unexpected expenses that are not allotted for by the means test
also frequently burden the elderly. An estimated 19 million of our
nation's elderly have little or no prescription drug coverage, which
may sometimes force them to incur large credit card balances in order
to obtain the necessary medication. 83 Furthermore, the recent corpo-
rate scandals and the fall of many corporate giants have left many
179. The elderly are likely to have more medical bills, receive less pay, suffer job reduction or
loss, or live on fixed pensions that do not increase with the rate of inflation. Robyn L. Meadows,
Bankruptcy Reform and the Elderly: The Effect of Means-Testing on Older Debtors, 36 IDAHO L.
REv. 227, 237 (2000)..
180. Id.
181. In order to obtain a fresh start under the means test, an elderly debtor would have to give
up most of his remaining economically productive years. Consider the following example of the
remaining lives of debtors aged 40, 50, 60, and 65.
Assuming each worked until the age of 70 and used a repayment plan of five years ...
[as the legislation proposes] the 40 year old would pay on the plan for one-sixth of his
remaining working years (5/30), the 50 year old would for one-quarter (5/20), the 60
year old one-half (5/10) and the 65 year old for his entire (5/5) remaining working
years. There would be little reason for these debtors to attempt repayment plans. If
means testing forecloses liquidation as an option, these debtors will be left with no
meaningful bankruptcy protection available.
Id. at 238.
182. Since the means test is not limited to wage earners, the elderly who may not be able
bodied or may be relying on a pension or another source of fixed income or assets, are included,
even if the inclusion is unintentional. Id.
183. News at Deadline, Hoses. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Dec. 5, 1998, at 75. While frequently
plaguing the elderly, these unexpected and, under the means test, unaccounted for, expenses,
may be encountered by a member of any demographic.
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employees, those planning retirement and those already retired, with-
out their promised pensions or 401(k)'s. 184
Adding insult to injury, just as the elderly population faces unique
hardship from limited incomes and unexpected hardships, they are
also particularly vulnerable to financial scams. For example, in 1948,
when the Arizona Baptist Foundation ("ABF") was formed as a non-
profit to raise money for Baptist churches and ministries, while at the
same time paying returns to investors, it seemed like a safe and sound
investment for many elderly investors. 185 However, in 1999, after
years of hiding losses and financial misrepresentations, aided by the
accounting services of Arthur Andersen, ABF declared one of the
largest non-profit bankruptcies in history, resulting in losses totaling
over $570 million for nearly 11,000 elderly investors. 186
B. Empirical Evidence of Abuse
Bankruptcy reform was based in part on the results of studies con-
ducted on debtors who file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and the
estimated percentage of such debtors who could repay a "substantial
portion of their debts." An October 1997 study, which the Credit Re-
search Center ("CRC") conducted and the credit card industry
funded,187 found that an estimated 30 percent of chapter 7 debtors
could repay at least 21 percent of their "'non-housing, non-priority
debts,' such as car loans and credit card debts, over a five-year pe-
riod. ' 188 The study concluded, "Our results imply that the bankruptcy
system itself is contributing to these rising costs by offering the oppor-
tunity to wipe out debt with a single signature to many borrowers that
have the ability to repay."' 89 Another study in March 1998, which
Ernst & Young conducted, found 15 percent of the Chapter 7 debtors
184. For example, Enron employees experienced losses ranging from $60,000 to
$1,000,000,000 in retirement plans and 401(k)s. Thomas Frank, Shocked, Shocked! Enronian
Myths Exposed, NATION, Apr. 8, 2002, at 17; William J. Angelo, Scandals Unleash 401(k) Woes,
ENG'o NEWS-REC., Feb. 25, 2002 at 47.
185. Anne Brady, Anderson Called to Account: Anderson Pays Foundation Investors, WALL
ST. J., June 6, 2002, at C20, 2002 WL-WSJ 3396887.
186. Id.
187. The study issued by Georgetown University's Credit Research Center was produced with
a $100,000 grant from Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard International Inc. Robert Cwiklik, Educa-
tion: Ivory Tower Inc.: When Research and Lobbying Mesh, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1998, at BI,
1998 WL-WSJ 3497148.
188. Richard M Stana, Personal Bankruptcy; Methodological Similarities and Differences in
Three Reports on Debtors' Ability to Pay, United States General Accounting Office, Mar. 17,
1999, at 1, http://www.abiworld.org [hereinafter GAO Report].
189. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by Congress, Lavished with Campaign
Cash, Lawmakers are "Reforming" Bankruptcy - Punishing the Downtrodden To Catch A Few
Cheats, TIME, May 15, 2000.
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studied could repay all of their non-housing secured debts, all of their
unsecured priority debts, and at least 20 percent of their unsecured
non-priority debts over a five-year period. 19°
However, a third study, conducted in March 1999 and funded by the
non-partisan American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI), found that 3.6
percent of Chapter 7 debtors, could repay the same debts repayable
under the Ernst & Young study. 191 Concluding with a strikingly dif-
ferent assertion than the CRC, the ABI's researchers found:
The vast majority [of those filing for chapter 7] belong in that chap-
ter. They have too little income after necessary expenses to repay
unsecured debt. It is vital, therefore, that no undue burdens be
thrust on that needy majority in order to flush out a small minority
of abusers. The amount that might be collected: less than $1
billion.192
Thus, this later study stood in stark comparison to those that the
credit industry conducted, creating a significant difference of opinion
among researchers, academia, interest groups, and members of
Congress.
There are many possible explanations for why the studies produced
such varying results. For example, in its review of all three studies, the
General Accounting Office suggested:
These differences include different (1) groupings of the types of
debts that could be repaid, (2) gross income thresholds to identify
those debtors whose repayment capacity was analyzed, (3) assump-
tions about debtors' allowable living expenses, (4) treatment of stu-
dent loans that debtors had categorized as unsecured priority debts,
(5) assumptions about the administrative expenses that would ac-
company a debtor repayment plan. It is also possible that differ-
ences in the sampling methods and time periods each report used to
select the debtors for analysis could have contributed to different
results. 193
A far more critical distinction, however, arises from the source of
funding. It is hardly surprising that the study directly and richly
funded by Visa and Mastercard produced the direst statistics indicat-
ing debtor abuse. 194 Not only does the provision of funding allow for
the production of self-serving studies that have the appearance of
credibility, such studies are merely the first step in a public relations
190. GAO Report, supra note 188.
191. Id.
192. Barlett, supra note 189.
193. Barlett, supra note 189, See generally, Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Tak-
ing the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debt-
ors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999).
194. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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process called "improganda." Here is how the process worked in
bankruptcy reform:
Lobbyists for banks and credit card companies seized on the [Credit
Research Center] study as they lobbied Congress for changes in fed-
eral law that would make it harder for consumers to file for bank-
ruptcy relief. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen cited
the study in a Washington Times opinion column, offering Ge-
orgetown's academic imprimatur as evidence of the need for "bank-
ruptcy reform." What Bentsen failed to mention was that the
Credit Research Center is funded in its entirety by credit card com-
panies, banks, retailers, and others in the credit industry. ... Bentsen
also failed to mention that he himself had been hired to work as a
credit-industry lobbyist.' 95
Thus, by paying for both the study and for Bentsen's services, the
finance industry was able to more fully circulate the study's results
without serious questions about its propriety being raised. Sadly, this
approach to public policy is far from uncommon and not limited to
bankruptcy reform. 196 Equally troubling is that Congress seems to
have completely disregarded the one study that undermined the very
validity of the need for a means test. 197
However, even if the Credit Research Center's gloomy findings are
taken as true, has the case for bankruptcy reform actually been made?
Recall that the study concluded some 30 percent of Chapter 7 debtors
could afford to repay about one-fifth of their general unsecured debt.
Are those numbers sufficient to justify revamping the entire consumer
bankruptcy system in a manner that will undoubtedly harm many indi-
viduals, especially the 70 percent who, as the study implies, cannot
afford to repay anything? Congress, through bankruptcy reform, has
steadfastly refused to answer this question.
At the same time, Congress has struggled to find a remedy for a
very real bankruptcy abuse, the homestead exemption. A form of
abuse that is most readily available to the wealthiest of debtors, the
homestead exemption permits a debtor to discharge his debts while
retaining sometimes lavish estates. The only requirement for such fa-
vored treatment is for the debtor to establish residence in a state such
as Florida 198 or Texas,199 which allow debtors to shield significant
195. Center for Media & Democracy, What Is Impropaganda?, available at http:/
www.prwatch.org/improp/impropaganda.html.
196. See generally People for the American Way, Buying a Movement, available at http://
www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspxoid=2055.
197. See GAO Report, supra note 188.
198. WorldCom's former chief financial officer, Scott Sullivan, is currently building a mansion
in Florida valued at over $15 million. Shawn Young, Without a Net: In Bankruptcy, Getting Laid
Off Hurts Even Worse, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at Al.
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amounts, if not all, of the equity in their homes from creditors.
Deeply offensive to most ordinary Americans and obvious in its inher-
ent unfairness, this aspect of bankruptcy reform has proven to be one
of the most controversial.200
Other questions Congress has also conveniently ignored, which are
the focus of the discussion below, concern just how robust the econ-
omy truly was in the late 1990s and how it has unquestionably
changed since, the inappropriate and inequitably applied notions that
Americans should be shamed away from bankruptcy relief, and the
credit industry's very own culpability.
C. The Economy
Even if the means test is a proper way to determine debtor abuse
and the credit industry produced an accurate study of the extent of the
abuse, the economic premises underlying bankruptcy reform simply
no longer exist. First, not everyone benefited from growth in the
1990s. Second, the robust nature of the economic conditions in the
late 1990s is not altogether true because, as is now known, some of
America's largest corporations were misstating their earnings. Third,
even if neither of the above is true, the economy now is most assur-
edly worse than it was just a few years ago.
Supporters of bankruptcy reform may have been seeing the "good
times" of America from a slightly skewed vantage point because they
looked at the economic conditions in the 1990s in isolation, without
considering long-term trends. Inequality has been rapidly encroach-
ing on America over the last few decades, and the robust economy of
the 1990s did not curb the climb of this inequality.20 1 In the 1990s the
inflation-adjusted incomes of the poor were flat, and middle class in-
comes grew only two percent. However, the average income of the
upper five percent of Americans grew by 27 percent.202 From 1985 to
2001, workers' pay rose by 63 percent, while CEOs' pay rose by 866
percent.20 3 To put it simply, there has been an "explosion of income,"
but, for the most part, only at the top of the income scale, which may
199. Enron's former CEO, Kenneth Lay, has his $7.1 million high-rise condo in Texas. Roy B.
White, Houston: The Enron Tour, TiME MAO., Feb. 18, 2002, at 26.
200. The $6 Million Solution: Consumer Creditor Interests Continue Their End of Session Push
Towards Bankruptcy Legislation, COMMON CAUSE, Sept. 14, 2000.
201. Jared Bernstein, Widening Gap a Threat to Future, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 14, 2000, http://
www.epinet.org/webfeatures/viewpoints/gap.html.
202. Id.




have masked the reality of the times in 1998, when bankruptcy reform
first arose in Congress.20 4
From the 1930s through today there have been significant shifts in
the equality and inequality of wages among America's rich, middle
class, and poor. Before 1930, a small number of very rich people con-
trolled most of the nation's wealth.205 Then, in the period following
the New Deal and World War II, a dominant middle-class society
emerged in America.206 In the decades following World War II the
income gaps slowly began to close, 20 7 but then around the 1980s the
lower economic segments began to lose ground. 20 8 While there was a
narrowing of the gaps during the 1990s, this was merely a step in the
right direction. The improvement could in no way account for the
losses suffered during the preceding twenty years.209 Moreover, the
slight gains of the 1990s are quickly vanishing as income disparities
continue to widen.210 The earnings of high-wage workers are continu-
ing to grow faster than those of middle- and low-wage workers, conse-
quently laying the same tracks of history that the nation experienced
before the 1930s.211
Furthermore, unknown to the public during the 1990s, a flurry of
corporate wrongdoings and scandals was robbing the nation of its eco-
nomic future. As one journalist appropriately described the now ap-
parent atmosphere of the 1990s:
Americans seem generally to have believed that they lived in a
world where the depictions of the business press were fairly accu-
rate, where pundits argued for things because they believed in them,
where accountants and stock analysts spoke truthfully, where politi-
cians represented their constituents and not just those with money,
where the stock market had been cleansed of crooks and was now
safe enough for little old ladies from Beardstown. The Enron story
204. Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, http://www.nytimes.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Of course this is a generalization that does not account for the disparities encountered by
gender, race, or other forms of discrimination.
208. American business policies since the 1960's may have contributed to the rising inequality
gap. In the 1960's corporations behaved like "socialist republics [rather] than cutthroat capitalist
enterprises" and the CEO's behaved like "public-spirited bureaucrats [rather than] captains of
industry." However, since the 1980's there has been a focus on "personal" leadership. However,
since the 1980's there has been a focus on "personal" leadership. Krugman, supra note 205.
209. News Release, Economic Policy Institute, Full Employment Behind Us, Nation faces
Growing Economic Insecurity Ahead: More Unemployment, Stagnating Wages and Jobs,
Deeper Debt and Less Security Define The State Of Working America, (Sept. 1, 2002), at http://
www.epinet.org/newsroom/releases/swa09OlO2.html.
210. Jared Bernstein, Wage Inequality Poised to Grow in 2002, 2001:3 QWES WAGE SUPPLE-
MENT, at http://www.epinet.org/qwes/qwes.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
211. Id.
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has flattened each of these faiths simultaneously. It's a perfect ideo-
logical reversal, a narrative that was supposed to prove the good-
ness of the New Economic Order and that has instead discredited it
in every respect.212
The past two years have produced record setting bankruptcies, 21 3
many of which were plagued by fraud.2t 4 These bankruptcies have
rippling effects throughout the economy: "The effects are bleeding
into everyday life as Kmart closes stores, United Airlines weighs more
layoffs and cuts in air service, communities see tax bases shrink, and
lenders get less than 20 cents back on every $1 of bad telecom
loans." 2 15
When large companies file for bankruptcy, the logical result is that
many employees lose their jobs. The ten largest companies filing for
bankruptcy in 2001 reported employing about 140,500 people. 216 The
top ten in 2002 had 444,600.217 Not surprisingly, loss of employment is
a major cause of consumer bankruptcy. 218
It is quite apparent that the American economy has endured its fair
share of hardships in the past few years. Threats of war and terrorism,
corporate scandals and CEO criminal wrongdoing, shrinking 401(k)s,
record setting bankruptcies, rising unemployment, massive wage cuts
and sinking consumer confidence have all contributed to a bleak econ-
omy which is struggling to keep its head above water. The perceived
"economic boom" of the 1990s is long gone,2 19 and with it went any of
the purported justifications for bankruptcy reform. 220
In sum, the economic arguments in support of bankruptcy reform
are as untrue as the means test is unsound. The downturn of the
American economy has long been eroding the very premises that mo-
tivated members of Congress to introduce bankruptcy reform. While
212. Frank, supra note 184.
213. Eight of the top 12 largest bankruptcy cases among publicly traded companies have been
filed in the past 13 months. Matt Krantz, Conseco Adds to Record Bankruptcy Filings, USA
TOIAY, Dec. 22, 2002, www.usatoday.com.
214. See infra note 230.
215. Krantz, supra note 213.
216. Young, supra note 198.
217. Id.
218. Audrey B. Blondin, Bankruptcy Reform Hurts Average Folks, NEw HAVEN REO.COM,
Aug. 21, 2002, at http://www.zwire.com/site/news (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
219. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
220. Consider the example of United Airlines, who filed for bankruptcy in December 2002.
They blamed their unions for the airlines financial difficulties. In response, the pilots underwent
a 29% pay cut. Mary Wisniewski, United Pilots Set to Take 29% Pay Cut, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec.
29, 2002, at 10. When considering actions of this kind under the bankruptcy reform bill, it is a
wonder if the banks will give these pilots a 29% discount on their mortgages, since their income
is now much less than before.
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the economy may have been thriving in the early days of the bill the
underlying reality of the very people touched by the bill were not, and
are still not. The economy has fallen into a recession, which places
even more burdens on those already struggling for resources. 22'
D. The Fallacy of 'The Lost Moral Stigma'
Supporters of the bankruptcy reform are concerned that filing for
bankruptcy has lost its moral stigma. While admitting this phenome-
non cannot be proved directly, supporters feel that it may be indi-
rectly inferred. They believe that many social factors today encourage
filing. Examples that have been cited include; non-delinquent bor-
rowers are filing at increasing rates; an increase in Hollywood celebri-
ties and other wealthy prominent citizens filing in the 1990s; increased
advertisements in which lawyers portray bankruptcy as an easy solu-
tion for overextended debtors; and a general decline in moral val-
ues.222 As Senator Grassley stated, "[W]e have had a general lack of
shame or personal responsibility that used to be associated with pay-
ing bills or not paying bills and the filing of bankruptcy. ' 22
3
However research has demonstrated that consumers do not take ad-
vantage of more favorable bankruptcy laws; instead economic factors
drive bankruptcy filings.224 A study of current economic activity dem-
onstrates that economic factors are a significant influence on bank-
ruptcy filings, to a much greater extent than the alleged effect of other
influences of dubious importance, like celebrities. 225
While politicians lament the loss of moral stigma in consumer bank-
ruptcies, surprisingly, the loss of moral stigma in other areas does not
221. Eric Gillin, Events Conspire Against Bankruptcy Reform; Recession and the Fallout from
Sept. 11 Have All but Killed a Measure that Looked Inevitable in Washington, THES-
TREET.COM, Jan. 10, 2002, 2002 WL 10629832. Some opponents of the bill argue that its
passage would prevent the United States from recovering from the recession. As one journalist
stated:
Japan has antiquated bankruptcy laws and millions are hopelessly in debt. Every penny
goes to servicing debt. That's why their economy remains moribund. (citations omit-
ted). 'This law would make us like them, preventing America from bouncing back from
recessionary times.'
Id. (citation omitted).
222. See, e.g., Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zwicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999
B.Y.U.L. Rev. 177 (1999). Judge Jones and Mr. Zwicki believe that:
[I]f debt "causes" bankruptcy, it is only because overspending and an unwillingness to
live within one's means "causes" debt. In short, one can re-characterize the "debt
causes bankruptcy" thesis as "overspending causes bankruptcy."
Id. at 224.
223. Barlett, supra note 190..
224. Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L. JP. 1079, 1084 (1998).
225. See supra Part IV.C.
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seem to be of great concern. When one company, Halliburton, Inc.,
sold one of its divisions it declared that its employees had "resigned,"
allowing it to confiscate their pensions. 226 Yet this company did ex-
actly the opposite when its former CEO resigned, changing the terms
of his $8.5 million charge against earnings to reflect the cost of its
parting gift to him 227 - that man is United States Vice President, Dick
Cheney.2 28
Also, in a number of the top bankruptcies filed in the last 13
months, the companies' former top executives have been criminally
investigated for illegal practices that led to their companies' bankrupt-
cies.2 2 9 These top executives, who conveniently had first hand knowl-
edge of the companies' troubles, were able to escape the effects of
bankruptcy. Enron's top executives made off with $1 billion before
the company announced its bankruptcy. 230 Maintaining an illusion of
success allowed insiders to sell their stock at good prices to nayve vic-
226. After Halliburton's Dresser Industries unit sold its majority stake in Dresser-Rand to
Ingersoll-Rand, Halliburton stopped covering 440 salaried employees under Dresser's pension
plan because they were no longer Dresser employees. Three hundred of the workers who were
under 55 and had been eligible for an enhanced early retirement benefit lost that privilege when
the unit was sold. Thus, Halliburton treated these employees as if they had "resigned." Dana
Milbank, Democrats Urge Cheney to Aid Ex-Employees, WASH. PosT, Sept. 11, 2002, at A03;
Paul Krugman, Cronies in Arms, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at A29.
227. Coincidently, Thomas White, appointed by Mr. Cheney as secretary of the army, was one
of the insiders at Enron, who made away with $1 billion before the company collapsed. Krug-
man, supra note 226.
228. Id.
229. Two top executives at WorldCom (the largest filing to date) have been criminally
charged. Bernard Ebbers was indicted for securities fraud related to an alleged scheme to falsify
WorldCom's books. While Ebbers has since resigned, he was rewarded with a $1.5 million yearly
pension and is paying back $408 million in loans from the company at an impressive rate of
2.8%. While the other chief executive, Scott Sullivan, was fired without severance, he wisely put
a $10 million dollar bonus in 2000 to good use. See supra note 199. Andrew S. Fastow, Enron
Corp.'s former chief financial officer was charged with "78 federal counts alleging that he mas-
terminded schemes to artificially inflate the company's profits and skim millions of dollars at
stockholders' expense." Randi F. Marshall, World and Nation: October Was Treat, not Trick for
Stocks, NEWS1AY (N.Y., N.Y.), Nov. 1, 2002, at A59. Another company, Tyco, recently filed for
bankruptcy and has had criminal charges brought against its former CEO as well. Dennis Koz-
lowski, Tyco's former CEO, may be charged with corruption and grand larceny. Tyco is aiming
to recover the millions in unauthorized expenses made by the chief-executive: a $17 million Fifth
Avenue apartment, a $5 million Nantucket home and a $30 million compound in Florida, as well
as the millions he spent on extravagant purchases, including a $6,000 shower curtain, a $15,000
umbrella stand, $97,000 worth of flowers, a $6,300 sewing basket, a $445 pin cushion and $2,900
of coat hangers. CNBC TV Special Report: SquawkBack Poll: CEO Largesse (CNBC television
broadcast, Nov. 5, 2002), available at http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/CNBCTV/Promos
(last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
230. Krugman, supra note 226.
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tims - people like their own employees, 231 who were then forced to go
down with the ship.
While economic factors are clearly a significant cause of bankruptcy
filings,232 rather than the loss of the moral stigma involved with the
process, it is also true that there is still a negative connotation in-
volved with filing. Filing can harm a person's reputation and can
make it more difficult to gain access to credit in the future. Federal
law allows credit bureaus to report a bankruptcy filing in the person's
credit report for up to ten years after the filing. A recent study, con-
ducted by David Musto, showed that reporting restricts one's access to
credit. Musto's study found that having the red flag of bankruptcy
was a constraint on an individual's ability to get X-edit.233 Further-
more, filing for bankruptcy when an individual or family is experienc-
ing financial troubles "makes the utmost economic sense for local
communities and the nation as a whole. Crushing families through a
harsh bankruptcy law means more people on welfare rolls, off tax rolls
and dependent on already hard pressed local charities. ' 234
E. Credit Industry's Culpability
While pursing bankruptcy reform, not only has Congress over-
looked abuse in the business sector, they have overlooked the credit
industry's abuse. Many bankruptcy scholars have argued that the rise
in personal bankruptcies is largely attributable to the credit card in-
dustry. 235 The combination of the industry's indiscriminate extensions
of credit and its failure to take precautionary measures to ensure that
they are only lending to creditworthy individuals has branded the in-
dustry as culpable.236
231. Other victims were the Florida state workers whose pension fund invested $300 million
in Enron during the company's final months. Id. The California Public Employees Retirement
System estimated its losses from WorldCom's fall at $565 million, and New York's state retire-
ment system's estimated loss was $300 million. James P. Miller, "House Panel Summons
WorldCom CEO," Chicago Tribune, June 27, 2002.
232. See supra Part IV.C.
233. Loretta J. Mester, Is the Personal Bankruptcy System Bankruptcy System Bankrupt?,
Bus. REV. (FED. REs. BANK OF PHILA.), Jan. 1, 2002, 2002 WL 20777433. Mr. Musto used
credit-file data from 1994-97 which showed that when the bankruptcy flag was removed from the
report, the more creditworthy past filers initiated new credit relationships, especially - high limit
credit cards, at a much faster rate than normal. Id.
234. Ralph Nader, Congress Becomes Bill Collector for American Credit Industry, CHARLES-
TON GAZETTE, Aug. 18, 2002, 2002 WL 5214076.
235. Daniel M. Stolz, Bankruptcy Reform: It Ain't Dead Yet, 12 N.J. LAW.: THE WKLY. NEWS-
PAPER 4, Jan. 27, 2003.
236. Id. As one journalist stated: "[Tihe rise in personal bankruptcies was never simply a case
of Americans turning shiftless and irresponsible. It was a case of credit providers getting care-
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The industry has worked hard over the past decade to make credit
card borrowing a way of life for most Americans. In 2001, credit card
companies sent out 5 billion solicitations,237 and their efforts have
paid off, in more ways than one. Today the average American has
multiple credit cards and the credit card companies are making enor-
mous profits off the interest rates. In 1990 there were 213 million out-
standing bank credit cards; in 2000, there were an estimated 458
million:238 "Outstanding credit card debt, the kind that tends to just sit
there running up interest, was $154 billion in 1990."239 In 2000, it was
around $486 billion.2 40 Also, between 1997 and 2001, the number of
active sub-prime or risky accounts tripled.241
While the financial services industry pleads innocent, they blame
the consumers for being irresponsible with their money. However,
the industry fails to recognize that 90 percent of those individuals fil-
ing for bankruptcy are forced to do so because of employment loss,
high medical bills, or divorce. 242 The industry also fails to recognize
that its very own practices have driven many others into bank-
ruptcy. 243 The credit card companies lure in needy consumers with
introductory offers at a low interest rate, and then quickly convert
that rate into "double digit" charges added to a list of mounting
fees.244 The companies do not hesitate to raise the debtor's credit lim-
its, as the cardholder falls further into debt.2 45 Eventually, some debt-
ors find themselves owing more than they expected when they
accepted the credit, due to the extremely low required minimum pay-
ments.2 46 Also, some lenders have taken "advantage of consumers'
ignorance by actually replacing low-rate mortgages with higher rate
mortgages, and adding pre-payment penalties to trap borrowers in the
loans. "247
less and lazy." Robert Reno, Credit Industry, Borrowers Finally Policed Themselves. NEWSDAY,
Mar. 8, 2000, at A56, 2000 WL 9998014.
237. Blondin, supra note 219.
238. Reno, supra note 237.
239. Id.
240. Id..
241. Broder, supra note 12.
242. Ivins, supra note 164.
243. Robert K. Heady, Credit-Card Issuers Patronize Politicians, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Sept.
11, 2002, at D02, 2002 WL 3008791.
244. Nader, supra note 235.
245. Id.
246. Ivins, supra note 164.
247. Too Poor To Go Broke, Sr. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, July 30, 2002, at B.6, 2002 WL
2576419. Recently, Citibank, a major supporter of the Bankruptcy Reform legislation, agreed to




Not surprisingly, proposals to stop predatory second mortgage lend-
ing, to prohibit solicitations to college students, or to require credit
card companies to provide consumers with a notice on their billing
statement with information about the cost and length of time it would
take to pay off balances at minimum payment rates have been virtu-
ally eliminated from the proposed reform legislation.248
Payday loans are another example of the culture that seems to en-
courage practices that lead to bankruptcy. As research by the Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons found: "[C]oupled with the
decline in the availability of small, unsecured loans from banks and
finance companies, many consumers, particularly those with modest
incomes or impaired credit, find that payday loans represent their only
source for small-sum, short term credit. ' 249 Payday loan operations
make short-term loans until the borrower's next paycheck. The stan-
dards required to qualify for the loans are not difficult to meet. In-
quiries regarding the consumer's ability to repay and credit checks are
not usually performed. 250 High annual interest rates become "utterly
indefensible" for borrowers.251 One survey reported that the average
payday loan annual percentage rate was 474 percent. 252
Weak consumer protection laws and the industry's deceptive veiling
allow these operations to continue in existence and persist in preying
on low-income Americans.25 3 While states have small loans statutes,
the payday lenders can claim that their operations are not really a
loan in the eyes of the law and circumvent these laws.254 Thus, the
lenders are free to operate without regulation and free to prey on low-
income individuals who cannot defend themselves against the high in-
terest rates and cannot survive without another loan.
Financial services giant, MBNA Corp., stated that bankruptcies ac-
counted for 40 percent of its losses, which last year totaled $4 bil-
lion.255 However, what the banks fail to reveal is that, even if the
bankruptcies did not occur, it is unlikely that they would be receiving
this lost money. Many of these debts are not collectable even outside
248. Blondin, supra note 219.
249. AARP, Payday Loans: A Model State Statute, available at http://research.aarp.org/con-
sume/dl6954_payday-l.html [hereinafter AARP Research]
250. Generally, consumers only need to demonstrate that they have a personal checking ac-
count and that they have been employed for a specified period with their current employer to
qualify. Id.
251. Payday Loans Fuel Bankruptcy Surge, MONrGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 17, 2002.
252. AARP Research, supra note 250.
253. Payday Loans Fuel Bankruptcy Surge, supra note 252.
254. Id.
255. Heady, supra note 244.
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of bankruptcy. The examples of predatory lending and payday loans
on behalf of the credit industry demonstrate the double standard that
the lending industry has created. Banks have made irresponsible
lending decisions and are now turning to Congress for relief of their
self-imposed consequences, through the bankruptcy reform bill.
V. CONCLUSION
The authors of this Article candidly acknowledge that the foregoing
discussion has been long on criticism, yet short on answers. However,
the purpose is to propose a more appropriate framework of analysis
for the future of bankruptcy reform legislation. Effective bankruptcy
reform legislation requires an understanding of "abuse," which, at a
minimum, requires careful examination of why consumer filings are at
record levels, and, also, that the rhetoric of reform has equal, perhaps
even greater, applicability in the corporate bankruptcy context.
Sound public policy demands that Congress broaden its perspective
on bankruptcy reform to include more than financial service industry's
self-serving version of reality and cease ignoring arguments that are
not accompanied by campaign contributions. Only then can Congress
fulfill its duty to "remain the domain of general citizenry" 256 and enact
laws that are reasoned, considered, and above all else, just.
256. 147 CONG. REC. S3544, S3545 (2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
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